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participatory decision analytic approaches. Helsinki 2004, 60 pp. + Appendices 
210 pp.
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Abstract
This work was undertaken in order to develop methods and techniques for 
evaluating systematically and comprehensively protective action strategies in 
the case of a nuclear or radiation emergency. This was done in a way that the 
concerns and issues of all key players related to decisions on protective actions 
could be aggregated into decision-making transparently and in an equal manner. 
An approach called facilitated workshop, based on the theory of Decision Analysis, 
was tailored and tested in the planning of actions to be taken. The work builds 
on case studies in which it was assumed that a hypothetical accident in a nuclear 
power plant had led to a release of considerable amounts of radionuclides and 
therefore different types of protective actions should be considered. Altogether 
six workshops were organised in which all key players were represented, i.e., 
the authorities, expert organisations, industry and agricultural producers. The 
participants were those responsible for preparing advice or presenting matters 
for those responsible for the formal decision-making. Many preparatory meetings 
were held with various experts to prepare information for the workshops. It 
was considered essential that the set-up strictly follow the decision-making 
process to which the key players are accustomed. Key players or stakeholders 
comprise responsible administrators and organisations, politicians as well as 
representatives of the citizens affected and other persons who will and are likely 
to take part in decision-making in nuclear emergencies.
The realistic nature and the disciplined process of a facilitated workshop 
and commitment to decision-making yielded up insight in many radiation 
protection issues. The objectives and attributes which are considered in a decision 
on protective actions were discussed in many occasions and were deﬁ ned for 
different accident scenario to come. In the workshops intervention levels were 
derived according justiﬁ cation and optimisation principles in radiation protection. 
Insight was also gained in what information should be collected or subject studied 
for emergency management. It was proved to be essential that information is in 
the proper form for decision-making. Therefore, methods and models to assess 
realistically the radiological and cost implications of different countermeasures 
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need to be further developed. In the consequent assessments, it is necessary 
to take production, economic, demographic and geographical information into 
account. Also, the feasibility and constraints of protective actions, such as logistics, 
require further investigation. For example, there seems to exist no plans in 
the EU or Nordic countries to dispose radioactive waste that may result from 
decontamination. 
The experience gained strongly supports the format of a facilitated 
workshop for tackling a decision problem that concerns many different key 
players. The participants considered the workshop and the decision analysis very 
useful in planning actions in advance. They also expected a similar approach 
to be applicable in a real situation, although its suitability was not rated as 
highly as for planning. The suitability of the approach in the early phase of an 
accident was rated the lowest. It is concluded that a facilitated workshop is a 
valuable instrument for emergency management and in exercises in order to 
revise emergency plans or identify issues that need to be resolved. 
The pros and cons of the facilitated workshop method can be compared with 
the conventional approaches. The general goal in all methods is that key players 
would be better prepared for an accident situation. All participatory methods, 
when practiced in advance, also create a network of key players. Facilitated 
workshops provide the participants with an forum for structured dialogue to 
discuss openly the values behind the decision. Stakeholder network can evaluate 
and augment generic countermeasures but all the possible and feasible protective 
actions cannot be justiﬁ ed and optimised in depth. The ranking of protective 
actions depends on weight put on an attribute and is thus dependent on the 
problem at hand.
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Sinkko, Kari. STUK-A-207. Päätösanalyysiin perustuva sidosryhmien yhteinen 
vastatoimenpiteiden suunnittelu ydinonnettomuustilanteiden varalle. Helsinki 
2004, 60 s. + Liitteet 210 s.
Avainsanat  ydinonnettomuustilanteiden hallinta, säteilysuojelutoimen-piteet, 
päätöksentekoprosessi, päätöksenteon tuki, moniattribuutti riskianalyysi
Yhteenveto
Tämän työn tavoite on suunnitella säteilysuojelutoimenpiteitä ja kehittää mene-
telmiä, joilla voidaan evaluoida systemaattisesti ja kattavasti suojelutoimen-
piteitä säteily- tai ydinonnettomuuksissa ja niiden ennakkosuunnittelussa. 
Toimenpiteiden suunnittelu tehdään siten, että kaikkien päätöksentekoon osal-
listuvien sidosryhmien näkökohdat otetaan huomioon tasapuolisesti ja avoimesti. 
Työssä on kehitetty ja testattu päätösanalyysiteoriaan perustuvaa päätösriihi-
menetelmää. Työ perustuu tapaustutkimusmenetelmään, jossa on oletettu onnet-
tomuus ydinvoimalaitoksella. Sen seurauksena huomattava määrä radionukli-
deja on levinnyt ympäristöön ja joudutaan pohtimaan erilaisia suojelutoimen-
piteitä. Tutkimuksen aikana järjestettiin kuusi päätösriihtä, joihin osallistui 
viranomaisia, eri alojen asiantuntijoita, teollisuuden ja maatalouden edustajia. 
Osallistujat olivat siten niitä, joiden tehtävä on valmistella toimenpidesuo-
situs tai niitä, jotka esittelevät suosituksen päätöksentekijöille. Ennen jokaista 
päätösriihtä pidettiin asiantuntijoiden välisiä kokouksia, joissa valmisteltiin 
tietopaketti riiheen osallistujille. Tutkimuksessa pidettiin tärkeänä noudattaa 
samanlaista päätöksentekoprosessia, mihin sidosryhmät ovat tottuneet. Sidos-
ryhmillä tarkoitetaan vastuullisia viranomaisia ja organisaatioita, politiikkoja 
ja väestön edustajia ja muita henkilöitä, jotka osallistuvat päätöksentekoon 
ydinonnettomuustilanteessa.
Päätösriihien realistinen perusluonne ja järjestelmällisyys, sekä sitoutu-
minen päätöksentekoon lisäsivät tietoa toimenpiteiden suunnittelusta. Toimen-
piteiden tavoitteista, tekijöistä - attribuuteista - ja toimenpiteiden seurausvai-
kutuksista keskusteltiin monissa yhteyksissä ja ne määriteltiin mahdollisten 
uusien tilanteiden varalle. Toimenpidetasot arvotettiin riihessä kansainvälisten 
säteilysuojeluperiaatteiden mukaisesti (oikeutus- ja optimointiperiaatteet). Riihi-
menetelmä paljastaa myös mitä tietoa tulee valmistella tai tutkia päätöksiä 
varten. Ennen kaikkea tiedon tulee olla päätöksentekoon soveltuvassa muodossa, 
ei tieteellistä keskustelua. Havaittiin lisäksi, että on tarpeellista kehittää edel-
leen menetelmiä, jotka arvioivat paremmin ja totuudenmukaisemmin eri sätei-
lysuojelutoimenpiteiden annossäästöt ja kustannukset. Seurausvaikutuksia 
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arvioitaessa on tarpeellista ottaa huomioon alueelliset tiedot kuten väestö-, elin-
keino- ja tuotantotiedot. Lisäselvityksiä tarvitaan myös toimenpiteiden toteut-
tamiskelpoisuudesta. Havaittiin esimerkiksi, ettei ole olemassa tarkkoja suun-
nitelmia mihin radioaktiivisten jätteet loppusijoitettaan ja miten kuljetetaan 
joissakin toimenpiteissä tarvittavat suuret tavaramäärät.
Tehty työ vahvistaa näkemystä, että päätösriihimenetelmä soveltuu hyvin 
sellaisten päätösten valmisteluun, joihin osallistuu eri sidosryhmiä. Riihiin osal-
listuneet pitivät yleisesti riihtä ja päätösanalyysiä hyvin hyödyllisenä suunni-
teltaessa suojelutoimenpiteitä etukäteen. He myös arvioivat tämäntyyppisen 
lähestymistavan soveltuvan todelliseenkin onnettomuustilanteeseen, joskin 
soveltuvuus ei arvioitu niin hyväksi kuin etukäteissuunnittelussa. Menetelmän 
soveltuvuus ydinonnettomuuden varhaisvaiheen nopean päätöksenteon tueksi 
arvioitiin alhaisimmaksi. Voidaan tehdä johtopäätös, että päätösriihi on hyödyl-
linen menetelmä ydinonnettomuuksien hallinnassa ja varautumisessa. Se auttaa 
suunnittelua ja tunnistaa kehittämiskohteita.
Päätösriihen valo ja varjopuolet voidaan arvioida vertaamalla sitä muihin 
sidosryhmien välisessä työskentelyssä käytätettyihin menetelmiin kuten kuule-
minen, neuvoa antavat lautakunnat ja suunnitteluryhmät. Kaikki nämä mene-
telmät, kun niitä harjoitellaan etukäteen, luovat sidosryhmien välisen verkoston. 
Päätösriihi tarjoaa osallistujille avoimen foorumin, jossa strukturoidun dialogin 
avulla keskustellaan päätöksen perusteista. Muissa menetelmissä voidaan arvi-
oida ja kartuttaa geneerisiä toimenpiteitä, mutta kaikkia mahdollisia vaihtoeh-
toja ei voida oikeuttaa ja optimoida syvällisesti kuten riihessä. Toimenpiteiden 
luokittelu riippuu attribuuteille annettavista painoista ja on tapauksesta riip-
puva.
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1 Introduction
The consequence spectrum of nuclear and radiological accidents, such as failure 
of a reactor, medical or industrial sources, has been estimated to be wide. Many 
accidents have no impacts offsite due to no or negligible release, some have 
far-reaching environmental consequences and very few might result in early 
deaths and other health effects off-site, such as increased cancer cases (NRC/
CEC 1997; NRC 1975). The consequences of occurred accidents in Windscale 
(1957), in Kyshtym (1957), in the Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl 
(1986) have also large variation (UNSCEAR 1988 and 2000). The consequences 
of an accident and intervention will depend substantially on the event, nuclide 
composition of the release and on the season (winter vis-a-vis the cultivation 
season). The choice of intervention measures is also linked to the legislation and 
living standard of the country potentially affected. Because of this diversity, and 
the constraints and deﬁ ciencies in consequence calculation tools in the past, 
international organisations have not been able to take into account all potential 
scenarios and all national circumstances. The recommended intervention levels 
have been based on reasoning or generic cost-beneﬁ t optimisation of protective 
actions which will most likely protect the population in an appropriate manner. 
Recommendations cover general and readily available countermeasures. For 
example, only withdrawal and substitution of contaminated foodstuffs have been 
considered. Detailed planning was seen as the duty of each individual country 
and deliberately left to national organisations.
Neither intervention planning nor the decision-making process can be 
developed from scratch in a nuclear emergency situation. In order to cope with 
any future accident, planning in advance both possible countermeasures and 
the decision-making process, developed both for the early and later phases, 
could ensure rational and transparent decisions. The importance of planning in 
advance and the need to develop a transparent decision-making process were 
clearly demonstrated after the Chernobyl (1986) and Coiania (1987) accidents. 
This study is a response to the international call for national planning in advance 
and for the development of the decision-making process in nuclear emergency 
management in order to be better prepared for any future nuclear accident.
Interventions affect various sectors of the society (primary production, 
industry, trade, population, consumers, clean-up workers etc.). There are different 
factors (radiological, economic, social, psychological etc.) that have to be taken 
into account when deciding on countermeasures (Allen et. al. 1996). The decisions 
are made under high uncertainties (French 1997). For example, the release 
assessments are very uncertain, the dose and the costs per individual can only 
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be predicted, not be measured at the time of the decision, and wide variations 
are possible. Protective actions, as concerning society widely, are group decisions. 
Key players have often different views on the problem and the importance of 
relevant objectives. 
Societal decisions are typically prepared in series of discussions, negotiations 
and meetings. The key players could be engaged in the decision-making process 
in various ways and often by the increased cost and complexity of the process 
(Mumpower 2001). The following citizen participation models are considered 
the most important to be reckoned with: advisory committees, planning cells, 
citizen juries, initiatives, negotiated rule making, mediation, compensation and 
beneﬁ t sharing and the Dutch study group (Renn et. al. 1995). The workshop 
proceedings of OECD/NEA (2001) also give many examples of how key players 
are involved in radiation protection. Participation is not aimed at replacing 
modern forms of representative democracy but should be an integrated part of 
the decision-making process (Renn et.al. 1995). Current practices range from the 
form where interested parties are only informed of the decision taken, to the form 
where the public based on a recommendation makes the decision  (McDaniels 
et. al. 1999). Many protective actions in a nuclear emergency would not involve 
any compulsion and the ﬁ nal decision would be left to the population (French 
et. al. 1993, IV). 
Individual participation methods have apparent advantages but some 
are also prone to shortcomings that have led to criticism (Gregory et. al. 1993; 
McDaniels et. al. 1999; Renn et. al. 1995). The decision might not be accountable 
and long-term planning might be neglected if the participants are not responsible 
for the implementation of the choice made. The working procedures and efﬁ ciency 
in the use of time in the group meetings have also often been considered to be 
poor (Hämäläinen and Leikola 1995; Sauri 2002; Susskind and Field 1996). 
Furthermore, key players might receive more information than they can utilise. 
Information could be in an unstructured form and not in the form needed in the 
decision-making process. The reported experience emphasises the importance of 
having relevant information, and clear procedures and methods for the decision-
making process. Not all participatory methods articulate factors and judgement 
systematically and openly to be viewed by all people concerned.
Openness, transparency and participation by the key players are all 
important factors for balanced decision-making on public issues. Decisions 
should be understood, accepted and supported by both the population and 
decision-makers, not only be made in demographic order (Alho 2004). Those who 
must bear the harm and/ or beneﬁ ts should have an opportunity to incorporate 
their objectives and values into the decision taken. The research in key players’ 
and public involvement in environmental decisions have led to the conclusion 
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that if the relevant parties are not engaged in the decision-making process the 
policy will fail and the ﬁ nal decision might ‘please almost no one and certainly 
infuriate many’ (Dubreuil et. al. 1999; Renn et. al. 1995; Susskind and Field 
1996). The international organisations in radiation protection have recognised the 
importance of prompt, open and transparent decision-making based on scientiﬁ c 
facts and social judgement (ICRP 2000; OECD/NEA 2002). They have emphasized 
that the basis for the decision must be perceived by the public, and all relevant 
factors concerning the decision should be considered in a rational manner.
The objective of this work in addition to planning countermeasures in 
advance is to develop methods to include the concerns of all key players openly 
and equally in the decision taken. The approach applied employs a group process 
where responsibility is placed on participants to assimilate information and to 
provide judgements. It has a clear structure based on the Decision Analysis. 
Multi-attribute decision analysis provides a suitable framework for dealing 
with the complexity of the decision problem. It helps to clarify the objectives 
(‘to avoid radiation-induced cancer cases’) and to identify the attributes that 
can be used to measure the success of a strategy in achieving the objective (‘the 
radiation dose’). It provides a reasoning framework that intertwines the beliefs, 
preferences and value judgements of the key players and achieves a transparent 
ranking of the various strategies available.
Decision analysis techniques are not a new approach for solving societal 
problems. It has been applied to solve social and environmental decisions such 
as wastewater treatment and wilderness preservation problem (McDaniels 1996; 
McDaniels and Roessler 1998; Renn et. al. 1995). Gregory and Keeney (1994) 
organised a workshop to elicit stakeholder’s values and used them as the basis 
for creating an improved set of alternatives whether to permit development 
of a coal mine within an isolated pristine tropical rain forest. Marttunen and 
Hämäläinen (1995) applied decision analysis as an individual interactive 
computer supported interview method and involved large number of stakeholders 
in two river development projects. The papers by Apostolakis and Pickett (1998), 
Hämäläinen (1988, 1990, 1992) Hämäläinen and Karjalainen (1992), Keeney and 
von Winterfelt (1993) and Keeney (1980) are examples of studies of problems 
which deals with clean-up hazardous waste site, energy policy of nuclear power 
and management of nuclear waste. In the ﬁ eld of nuclear emergency management, 
decision analysis has been applied and facilitated workshops have been organised 
in various countries (Albrecht et. al. 1997; Aumonier and French 1992; Bartzis 
et. al. 1999, III; French et. al. 1996; International Chernobyl Project 1991; Sinkko 
1991; Zeevaert et. al. 2001).
At the end of the 1980s the International Commission of Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) was revising its basic principles in radiation protection, and 
14
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introduced the terms justiﬁ cation and optimisation. It was also recommended 
to apply decision-aiding techniques in radiological protection (ICRP 1989). 
International organisations have demonstrated how justiﬁ cation and optimisation 
could be applied to the planning of protective actions (OECD/NEA 1990; ICRP 
1991; IAEA 1994). Because of their role, international organisations, for example 
the IAEA, aim to provide a benchmark against which national plans can be 
compared. A simple cost-beneﬁ t analysis approach has been adopted for that 
purpose. 
At the same time, at the end of 1980 the author of this paper made a wide 
study on decision aiding techniques and its potential in countermeasure planning 
(Sinkko 1991; Gjörup et. al. 1992; Walmod-Larsen (ed.) 1994). The main issue 
was how the justiﬁ cation and optimisation could be done in practice. Gradually it 
becomes evident that multiattribute value or utility analysis of protective actions 
done by a scientist in emergency management community could not cover all 
aspects the decision. All relevant parties should come together and aggregate 
their views and judgements in rational manner in the decision. The format of 
facilitated workshop (also called decision conferencing) was seen as a promising 
format to do the planning equally and openly.
Six facilitated workshops were arranged to learn how to improve the 
decision-making process and plan protective actions in advance. The ﬁ rst 
workshops followed a two-day decision conferencing approach (French et. al. 
1993, IV and 1996). Other forms of decision conferences have also been suggested 
for example the spontaneous decision conferencing concept, where the whole 
process can be accomplished in just a few hours and with minimal arrangements 
(Hämäläinen and Leikola 1995). In problems involving experts and higher level 
policy makers time is always limited. Therefore, this more concise type of approach 
was seen to be practical. In planning in advance shorter workshops necessitate 
extensive background information and preceding preparatory meetings but this 
kind of process was seen to comply with conventional emergency management. 
Another approach is the interview technique in order to analyse the decision 
situation from the perspective of different stakeholders. This approach was also 
considered useful in this study. 
15
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2 Review of literature
2.1 Intervention principles for radiation emergencies 
Situations where radioactive materials exist or threaten to spread into the 
environment, and where protective actions are being considered to reduce the 
exposure, are called intervention situations (ICRP 1991). A nuclear or radiation 
accident, should it happen, or a prolonged exposure to radioactive materials of 
natural origin may call for intervention. In most situations, intervention cannot 
be applied to the source itself as in practice, e.g., operating a nuclear power 
plant where the structure of a source could be planned and the doses predicted. 
Intervention has to be applied to the environment, as the control of exposure 
pathways, or to individuals’ freedom of action. In intervention protective actions 
have to be justiﬁ ed and optimised, whereas in practice the activity has to be 
justiﬁ ed and the radiation protection optimised.
The system of radiological protection deﬁ ned by the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 2000) implies the protection of 
both individuals and the population. Firstly, the protection of individuals requires 
that ‘deterministic health effects must be prevented and the individual risk 
of stochastic effects must be restricted’. Secondly, the system requires a wider 
justiﬁ cation to obtain the maximised health beneﬁ t for the greatest number of 
people by also considering the social and economic circumstances: ‘all exposures 
shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being 
taken into account’. According to the ICRP, these statements could be linked to 
ethical principles, which link is considered important for societal acceptability 
of the system of radiological protection. In Operational Research it has also 
seen necessary to consider all ethical arguments in environmental decisions, 
and ethical systems to provide a rationale on the value of safety (Rauschmayer, 
2001; Schulze 1980). However, the ICRP or any other equivalent international 
organisation has not explicitly referenced a speciﬁ c ethical doctrine.
The basic principles for introducing protective actions in an intervention 
situation, recommended by international organizations (OECD/NEA 1990; IAEA 
1994; ICRP 1991, 1993, 2000; IAEA/BSS 1996), are based on the justiﬁ cation 
and optimization of protective actions. They are intended to be generally 
applicable irrespective of the time elapsed, the distance from the source or the 
level of exposure. The basic principles recommended by the ICRP (1991) are as 
follows:
‘The proposed intervention should do more good than harm, i.e., the reduction 
in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufﬁ cient to justify 
the harm and the costs, including social costs, of the intervention.’
16
STUK-A207
‘The form, scale, and duration of the intervention should be optimized so 
that the net beneﬁ t of the reduction of dose, i.e., the beneﬁ t of the reduction in 
radiation detriment, less the detriment associated with the intervention, should 
be maximized.’
The dose limits or any other predetermined dose limits are not considered 
applicable in intervention (ICRP 1991). The use of dose limits as the basis for 
deciding on intervention could result in marginal dose savings and could do more 
harm than good. ‘The dose limits are intended to be used in practice to apply to 
the dose received, not to the dose averted, which deﬁ nes the implementation of 
intervention.’
The protection strategy for the population affected by a nuclear or 
radiological accident is, ﬁ rst of all, to do everything possible to avoid deterministic 
health effects and thereafter to implement protective actions with the aim of 
averting doses to the population and to avoid stochastic health effects. The 
deterministic health effect in radiation protection is deﬁ ned to mean health risks 
such as death or vomiting and stochastic effects, e.g., cancer cases. If the projected 
dose from all pathways approaches the thresholds for serious deterministic 
effects, protective actions are almost always considered justiﬁ ed. In addition, 
below the thresholds for such effects the exposure of individuals who are the most 
at risk could be unacceptable because of a high stochastic risk. Protective actions 
will in general be justiﬁ ed if the existing annual effective dose is rising towards 
100 mSv. This value may be used as a generic reference level for establishing 
protective actions under nearly any conceivable circumstance (ICRP 2000). The 
recommended reference level for deterministic health effects and high stochastic 
risks could be used as a constraint in the justiﬁ cation and optimisation process 
performed by the decision analysis.
Because of the possibility of deterministic effects and high stochastic risks 
the protection of individuals and hence the individual dose may be a signiﬁ cant 
factor in the decision-making process (ICRP 1993). If the protective actions 
taken are not justiﬁ ed from the viewpoint of the individuals concerned, it should 
be considered if the collective dose of the exposed group could be reduced by 
protective actions. It might be that the members of the group could not be known 
by name like in actions affecting the consumption of food. 
The implementation of protective action - including no-action - entails 
harm and beneﬁ t to the population, e.g., monetary costs, social disruption, 
and psychological or physical health risks. If the beneﬁ t of a protective action, 
which includes the dose averted, is greater than its associated harm, the action 
is justiﬁ ed. Justiﬁ cation requires that the relative importance of attributes 
in different actions has been judged. This assessment is independent of the 
decision-making process or aid (ICRP 2000). ‘These judgements have to be 
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made irrespective of the decision-aiding technique used. Indeed, they are made 
implicitly even if a decision-aiding technique is not used. (The technique does 
not create the need for judgements; rather it makes them explicit!).’ A simpliﬁ ed 
example of justiﬁ cation is a cost-beneﬁ t analysis in which the avertable collective 
dose (manSv) is converted into monetary units by α-value, e.g., 20 000 €/manSv 
(see e.g. IAEA 1994). If the difference, the avertable dose expressed in monetary 
units minus the costs of action, is positive, the action is justiﬁ ed. 
Justiﬁ cation of protective actions in radiation protection is not independent 
of other choices made by society and particularly not independent of general 
protection of health (ICRP 1990; IAEA 1994; OECD/NEA 2002). The resources 
of a society are ﬁ nite, and if more resources are allocated to radiation protection, 
it means that less effort and fewer resources are allocated to other aids of health 
protection. Respectively, more effort and resources allocated to other types 
of health protection mean less effort for radiation protection. It is seen to be 
reasonable that the same amount of effort and resources should be expended to 
avoid serious illness, above all cancers and premature death caused by radiation 
or other causes.
The revealed assessment of the resource allocation is not straightforward, 
although made implicitly in many everyday decisions that involve health risk. 
The IAEA has discussed extensively the value, in monetary terms, of averting 
the radiation-related health risk and hence the level of resources to be allocated 
to reducing the dose (IAEA 1994). As a rough estimation, a sum of 20,000 US$ 
per manSv saved has been given for typical resource allocation. The range given 
by ICRP is 3,000 - 100,000 US$ per manSv (ICRP 1993).
If it is possible to choose the form, scale and duration of a protective action 
or if there are several feasible actions, the best action should be chosen, i.e., 
the action that maximizes the net beneﬁ t. The optimization of intervention is 
achieved by ranking all the feasible actions, e.g., applying decision analysis. The 
protective action with the highest ranking will produce the maximum beneﬁ t. The 
operational research and radiation protection communities interpret the term 
optimization a bit differently and the OR does not use the term justiﬁ cation. In 
the discussion part of this thesis there is a proposal how these terms could be 
understood when applying decision analysis.
In optimization it is thus assumed that all actions and factors are deﬁ ned 
at the beginning of the analysis. In practice, however, it is not possible to deﬁ ne 
all actions before making some preliminary numerical assessments and running 
through some rough calculations to gain a feeling for what numbers are important 
and require reﬁ ned assessment or even new data collection. Although preferences 
are associated with numbers in the planning of intervention levels, optimization 
is not a purely mathematical problem. 
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Realism is sought in consequence assessment both in nuclear emergency 
management and in risk management text books, not under- or overestimation 
(IAEA 1994; Wilson and Shlyakhter 1997). The consequences of an action should 
be assessed for a well-deﬁ ned group, e.g., for a municipality or children, which 
could be met by a feasible action. Below the thresholds for deterministic health 
effects and high stochastic risk, the dose reduced by an action is assessed with 
the mean dose in the group to be protected, not on the basis of the maximum 
individual dose received by a group. If there is a deﬁ nable subgroup within the 
deﬁ ned group, that is more at risk (e.g., forest workers, farmers), the feasible 
actions for this group should be justiﬁ ed and optimized separately. In addition, 
if the consequences of an action, which might be a beneﬁ t or a disadvantage, 
concern part of the population not belonging to the deﬁ ned group, the consequence 
to the group should also be considered in the decision taken.
The international organisations have also given numerical guidance on 
intervention levels. The recommendations of the ICRP are based on ‘objective 
assessment of the health risks associated with exposure levels and on radiological 
protection attributes’ (ICRP 2000). The Commission has also utilised generic 
intervention level assessments performed by other international organisations. 
The advice is expected to serve as an input for the ﬁ nal decision-making 
process. 
The IAEA has provided guidance that could be used as an aid for national 
authorities in establishing their own intervention levels (IAEA 1994). In order 
to have a common basis for national decisions the Safety Guide gives generic 
intervention levels which, prior to accidents, are based on generic accident scenario 
calculations.  Guidance is provided for major protective actions: sheltering, 
evacuation, relocation, iodine-prophylaxis and food restrictions. Numerical values 
are derived with cost-beneﬁ t analysis.
The expert groups of the World Health Organisation, WHO, has 
recommended an intervention level of an individual dose of 5 mSv as justiﬁ ed 
by comparison with variation of natural background radiation (WHO 1988).
The Codex Alimentarius Commission of the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation, FAO, and WHO have adopted generic intervention exemption levels 
to control foodstuffs in international trade that have become contaminated with 
radionuclides in an emergency situation (FAO/WHO 1991). They are intended 
to be values below which no restrictions are required. The derived intervention 
exemption levels have been calculated from intervention levels of 5 mSv annual 
committed effective dose and 50 mSv annual effective thyroid dose (131I), 550 kg 
of food consumed in one year, all of which is contaminated, taking into account 
the sensitivity of infants and the food consumption pattern, and dose per unit 
intake factors for the radionuclides of concern.
19
STUK-A207
The Group of Experts set up under the terms of Article 31 of the Euratom 
Treaty has recommended that the guidance in the Radiation Protection 87 
report should be the basis for setting intervention levels by competent national 
authorities (CEC 1997). The cost-beneﬁ t analysis has been applied to derive 
recommended ranges of intervention levels. Recommended action levels for 
foodstuffs are congruent with those of the Codex Alimentarius commission 
(Council Regulation No. 3954/87). 
2.2 The decision-making process
No single agreed structure exits for the emergency management process common 
to all countries in Europe (Bartzis et. al. 1999, III; Carter and French 2004). 
There are different persons and organisations that are responsible for decision-
making and for implementation of countermeasures at different phases of an 
accident, and the process vary from country to country. Nonetheless, there are 
common themes. At the accident site the operator or licensee for the practice is 
in general responsible for controlling the event. The licensee may also be the 
ﬁ rst organisation to take the initiative in implementing off-site protective actions 
close to the site based on emergency plans. In that case a shift of responsibility 
to the rescue service and/or to the competent authority for implementation and 
planning of emergency actions will be agreed in the early hours of the incident. 
In the longer term the decision-making is subject to a country’s administrative 
and legal system. 
In minor local accidents the mayor, the head of the local rescue team 
or the regional ﬁ re chief of the municipality concerned leads the operation in 
domestic accidents. A leading group could be called to assist the regional leader. 
All relevant local authorities are represented in the group. 
At the provincial level the provincial administration board (all pertinent 
sectors represented) and at the national level, in many countries in Europe, the 
Ministry of the Interior can issue orders related to rescue operations. The Ministry 
of the Interior is also generally responsible for the overall co-ordination of actions 
within the central government, especially in the early phase of an accident or, 
as in Finland, nuclear accidents abroad with transboundary contamination. The 
ministry can set up a co-ordination group which is comprised of representatives 
from all relevant ministries and expert organisations. 
The basic principle in nuclear emergency management in central 
government is that each branch of administration is responsible for preparedness 
arrangements, emergency responses and information on actions in their own 
sector of authority. Hence each ministry decides on countermeasures in their 
sector of authority and presents matters to the Council of State in issues requiring 
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political commitment. The common distribution of responsibilities, which is 
particularly valid in Finland, is as follows (Sinkko et. al. 2001):
• the Ministry of Health is responsible for the health protection of the 
population (advice on iodine prophylaxis in contingency plans, psychological 
aid, social support, medical treatment etc.), and for providing logistics for 
evacuees; 
•  the Ministry of Trade is responsible for food and trade restrictions; 
•  the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for measures in agriculture, 
forestry and ﬁ sheries and for implementation of the agricultural 
countermeasures covering primary production, i.e., all foods from ﬁ eld to 
table; 
•  the Ministry of Environment is responsible for housing of relocated population 
and reclamation of contaminated land (waste from decontamination);
•  other relevant bodies and ministries in accident situations include the 
information unit, which co-ordinates information activities. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is responsible for issuing information to foreign media on 
national accidents and the Ministry of Transport and Communications is 
responsible for communications (broadcasting companies), transport etc.
In most countries expert organisation on nuclear and radiation related issues 
assists all administrative branches. The duties of organisations regarding off-
site emergency management are inter alia: to perform radionuclide analyses, 
to assess the radiation situation, to assess and predict radiation-related health 
consequences and, as a safety authority, to prepare and give recommendations 
on countermeasures to other authorities.
Decision-making takes place in groups of various sizes and compositions, 
ranging from local emergency services through local government to central 
government bodies. For example, the task of radiation protection and other experts 
may be to prepare the recommendations or comments which are considered by 
all relevant parties who have interests in and concerns with protective actions. 
The formal decision is typically made in the presentation of matters to the 
President, Governor or maybe, in a less formal way, to the Director General 
of Rescue Services. For example, later on it may turn out to be necessary that 
the waste disposal or the coverage of costs requires a new law. A bill is ﬁ rst 
discussed in a preliminary debate and then sent to the proper committee. After 
hearing specialists and various parties concerned the committee is to take a 
statement about the law proposal. It is then sent back to the plenary session for 
three readings, the last one for passing it. The formal decision is made in the 
presentation of a bill to the President. 
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All in all, the power in societal decisions is fragmented, i.e., scattered among 
many people and many decision-making phases that a single decision-maker 
cannot exercise much power in a decision. Alho (2004) and Sauri (2002) have 
observed this fragmentation in the political decision-making process. A precursory 
activity always has inﬂ uence on the decision. The sense of power could only be 
perceived if elected ofﬁ cials, after a reasoned address or report, reconsider their 
preliminary decision or even change it. Decision-making is often a long process 
and it is difﬁ cult to separate preparatory work and evaluation from each other. 
It might be difﬁ cult to see where and when the actual decision is taken. 
In general, a decision has been agreed upon before the formal decision 
is taken and it is too late to try to affect the decision in the phase of voting or 
presentation of matters (Sauri 2002). No doubt decisions will be taken outside 
ofﬁ cial meetings, but even in that case, the grounds for a decision should be 
stated publicly instead of the majority announcing the decision. Sauri (2002) 
has proposed a way of improving the political culture in which the grounds for a 
decision or proposals should be announced publicly to be assessed and criticized by 
all interest groups. The credibility of politics or democracy is always undermined 
when the grounds are not explained. Susskind and Field (1996) have stressed 
that in environmental decisions decision-makers and government ofﬁ cials should 
acknowledge the need for quality information, effective communication and 
mutually beneﬁ cial relationships, not employing techniques such as stonewalling, 
whitewashing, and blocking and blaming. 
Alho (2004) as well as Sauri (2002) has become to the conclusion that 
the decision-making process should be expanded towards greater openness and 
transparency. Alho (2004) in studying the exercise the power and the decision-
making process in Finland acknowledges the need to broaden opportunities for 
participation. Participation and rational dialogue are vital for democracy.
An elected ofﬁ cial should remain an elected ofﬁ cial and not behave as an 
expert (Sauri 2002; Lackey 1997; Susskind and Field 1996). He or she should 
control the decision-making process in a way that ﬁ xed objectives can be achieved. 
He or she should speak in such a manner that those who have given the power 
can understand the issue. Experts should not have the role of an elected ofﬁ cial 
or politician. They make technical calculations and present reports to ensure 
that elected ofﬁ cials are able to understand the problem and the consequences 
of decision options. Their role in decision-making process is essential. It has been 
proven that whoever ﬁ rst writes a reasonable report it will be difﬁ cult to change 
the content of the report during the decision-making process. 
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2.3 Decision analysis and its application in nuclear 
emergency management
The ICRP has seen decision analysis as an important practical embodiment 
of the optimisation concept in radiological protection (ICRP 1989, 2000). The 
problem could be better clariﬁ ed if the radiological protection options were 
properly identiﬁ ed and their performance assessed in terms of risk reduction, 
costs and other relevant factors. A systematic approach ensures the recognition 
of the judgements involved. 
Operational Research (OR) over the past 40 years has transformed the 
abstract, mathematical discipline of decision theory into a potentially useful 
technology known as decision analysis, which may assist key players in handling 
large and complex problems and the attendant ﬂ ows of information. Decision 
theory and its use in decision analysis is a branch of Operational Research, 
which has links to economics and psychology. Decision analysis is not intended 
to be used to solve problems automatically. Its purpose is to produce insight 
and understanding in order to help people to make better choices. It is both an 
approach and a set of techniques to rank options according to people’s preferences. 
The theory of prescriptive decision analysis is described in detail in the literature 
(Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Keeney 1992; Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986; French 
1988; Goodwin and Wright 1992; Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa 1999). This 
chapter brieﬂ y explains multi-attribute decision analysis and how it could be 
applied in nuclear emergency planning (Sinkko 1991; Gjörup 1992).
In decision theory it is recognised that people could beneﬁ t from the support 
and guidance of structured decision analysis. Where this is not the case, as e.g. 
in recurrent, experience-based decisions, it might seem simpler, more efﬁ cient 
and more acceptable to introduce a problem or a complete list of alternatives 
and their consequences into the decision-making process without recourse to 
any formal analysis. Nuclear accidents are very rare and their consequences 
dissimilar. Therefore the decision-making process cannot be based on daily, 
recurrent experience. An analytical approach could be advantageous in unusual 
decisions, also helping to focus on pertinent information collection. 
Secondly, studies indicate that when left to their own devices people 
easily create and hold on to many kinds of inconsistent beliefs and preferences 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Spetzler and Staël von Holstein 1975; Gregory, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic 1993). This view is supported by research indicating that 
the correlation between preference rankings derived from holistic judgement and 
those derived from decision analyses decreases as the number of attributes in 
the problem increases (Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Even in the absence of 
seriously conﬂ icting objectives, unguided intuitive decision-making is susceptible 
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to many forms of inconsistency. People’s preferences may be dictated by the 
presentation of a problem and not by its underlying structure, which may lead 
to irrationality.
The essence of decision analysis is to break down complicated decisions 
into small, manageable pieces that can be dealt with individually and then 
recombined logically. In this one-step-at-a-time approach many decision problems 
may be resolved by considering what are the relevant objectives, and alternative 
actions, what might happen as their consequence and what is the prioritisation 
among the consequences. 
Before any formal or informal analysis is made, it is essential to identify 
the key players, e.g., the authorities, expert organisations, industry, producers, 
the public and the formal decision-makers. The decision to be taken and the 
purpose of the analysis have to be deﬁ ned as well. The analysis may well serve 
other purposes rather than lead to prompt decisions. The planning of protective 
actions in advance is a common example.
Objectives and attributes
Many researchers in the decision theory have proposed that identiﬁ cation of 
objectives relevant to the decision problem is most important because alternative 
actions are important only as a means to achieve these objectives (Keeney 1992, 
1994). In other words, quoting an old saying, ‘if you don’t know where you are 
going, any road would do’, ﬁ ts here. In order to be more useful and understandable, 
objectives should be measurable. In decision analysis numerical scale are used 
to evaluate how objectives can be achieved by actions. The related numerical 
variable is called an attribute.
Objectives and attributes are not always evident, but time and effort is 
needed to specify them clearly and fully. Incomplete speciﬁ cation will lead to too 
narrow a focus (Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa 1999). Objective identiﬁ cation 
could be facilitated by thinking of the pros and cons of potential alternatives. 
It might also be effective to compare prior attribute deﬁ nitions in analogous 
problems. 
An attribute hierarchy, also called a value tree, can be useful in deﬁ ning 
objectives and attributes (Keeney 1992). The top layer of the tree contains very 
general and sometimes vague values. The values become more speciﬁ c the lower 
one goes down the tree. The building of the objective hierarchy is continued until 
objectives that are measurable, operational or easy to assess judgementally, are 
found. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) propose the following criteria for examining 
the applicability of the attributes: completeness, operationality, decomposability, 
absence of redundancy and minimum size.
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In nuclear emergency management international organisations have 
listed a generic group or abbreviations of objectives: minimising the radiation 
dose, physical risks, monetary costs, anxiety and disruption of actions, and 
maximising the reassurance produced by intervention (ICRP 1991, 2000; IAEA 
1994). Certain authors in emergency management community have also written 
down the deﬁ nition of fundamental attributes that they have proposed or used 
in the analysis (French 1992; Hedemann-Jensen et. al. 1996; Morrey and Potter 
1994; Atherton and French 1998). 
Alternative actions 
One essential stage in emergency management and in decision analysis is to 
identify all feasible alternatives of actions. International organisations have 
published generic guidance on the primal protective actions considering reduction 
in dose, especially for the early phase. For planning purposes, protective actions 
have been listed and categorised into those that restrict people’s activities or 
the use of contaminated food or consumables and into those which prevent 
radionuclide incorporation in the human environment, food or consumables 
(ICRP 1991; IAEA 1994). 
In planning countermeasures for the event of a nuclear accident generic, 
protective actions can be developed further by considering the possibility of 
changing the action’s scale, timing and duration. For example, the population group 
to be protected can be modiﬁ ed. It is useful to iterate between the articulation of 
attributes and creation of alternatives in order not to end up with too limited set 
of alternatives. All feasible actions have to be deﬁ ned - including no action at all 
- which might be implemented to control a certain exposure pathway. In deﬁ ning 
the action, its technical and social feasibility, and national circumstances should 
be considered; can it be implemented in practice as has been planned? 
The aim of radiation protection in nuclear emergency management is to 
reduce doses by implementing countermeasures. Accidents will cause negative 
social and psychological impacts.  After the Chernobyl accident it was observed 
that psychological health consequences were the most signiﬁ cant as compared 
with the economic and radiological ones (Allen et. al. 1996; IAEA 1991). It has 
been concluded that radiological countermeasures might not withdraw anxiety or 
stress alone but in addition actions to mitigate social and psychological impacts 
are needed, for example debrieﬁ ng where victims by discussions work trough 
their anxiety (Haukkala and Eränen 1994). 
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Consequence assessment 
Consequences are the values of attributes in various actions, e.g., the assessed 
doses before and after the actions are taken and the costs of the actions. The 
measurement of these attributes is easy because we can identify the variables 
representing them. However, for attributes such as reassurance and anxiety, 
it will be more difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd appropriate statistics or a variable that can be 
quantiﬁ ed or expressed on a characteristic scale. The technique that can be used 
to express the preferences over the values of an attribute is grade scales, direct 
rating of the consequence, which is often used, e.g., in schools and technical 
magazines.
In direct rating, the most preferred option, for anxiety for instance, is given 
a value of 100 and the least preferred option the value of zero. The other options 
are ranked between zero and 100, according to the degree of preference for one 
option over another in terms of anxiety. The technique seems robust but numbers 
do not always need to be precise. The availability of relevant information could 
be more important than its precision.
All in all, rational decision-making requires that the consequences in 
each action are assessed realistically, without overestimation. Conservatism 
in assessment may cause overestimation of the beneﬁ t of an action, an excess 
of monetary resources and an increase in unnecessary stress among the 
population.
There are different consequence assessment tools for nuclear emergency 
management, for example: ARGOS (http://www.pdc.dk/nucsystems-uk/), COCO-
1 (Haywood, Robinson and Heady 1991), OECD/NEA (2000), RODOS (Ehrhardt 
and Weis 2000) and WSPEEDI (Chino et. al 2000). These softwares are planned 
to assess, present and predict mainly the radiological consequences of an accident 
and the monetary costs of actions. However, in the workshops reported here 
it was not possible to calculate all the consequences needed in the decision-
making process. Commercial software can be and were utilised in consequence 
assessment, for example GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and spreadsheets 
together with statistical and production information. 
Trade-offs 
The avertable dose achieved by a countermeasure is probably not of equal 
importance to its monetary cost. In all decisions - whether explicit or not - the 
range of attributes has to be balanced, e.g., by assessing the weights on the 
attributes. They represent the judgement concerning the relative importance of 
the levels of attributes. For example, how much is society ready to invest to avoid 
a certain dose? The importance of an attribute not only depends on its conceptual 
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value, such as health, but also on its range of values, such as the number of cancer 
cases. A thorough assessment of trade-offs is essential for good decision-making 
but it is not always an easy matter and is prone to mistakes (Keeney 2002).
The trade-off values are subjective, not objective. There are no universal 
values. The values are related to every speciﬁ c problem, and in addition, they 
change according to opinions and are dependent on resources of a society. There 
are methods and studies which make it possible to estimate trade-off values 
and shed more light and understanding on the values, for example, studies 
on willingness to pay and the costs of life-saving interventions (Bengsson and 
Moberg 1993; Katona et. al. 2003; Ramsberg and Sjöberg 1997, Tengs et. al. 1995). 
They have reported variations over 11 orders of magnitude in values with the 
median of 20,000 - 40,000 US$ per statistical life saved per year. Tengs (1995) has 
concluded that more lives could have been saved by shifting resources between 
life-saving interventions.
However, methods such as willingness to pay studies and contingent 
valuation, that are carried out to prevent harm, have been criticised. The problem 
with contingent valuation techniques is that ‘they capture attitudinal intentions 
rather than behaviour, important information is omitted from questionnaires 
and their results are susceptible to inﬂ uence from cognitive and contextual 
biases’ (Gregory, Lichtenstein and Slovic 1993). The results of willingness to 
pay studies are not any more useful because case studies are usually poorly 
structured and do not indicate the multidimensional values behind decisions. 
Values are multidimensional and people have strong feelings and beliefs about 
these values, which typically are not numerically quantiﬁ ed and are not expressed 
in monetary terms. Careful structuring of the problem is necessary to identify 
the underlying multidimensional values, attitudes to risk and trade-offs related 
to the problem. These are created during the elicitation process in decision 
analysis. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to assess trade-off values using 
problem independent studies. Indeed, a proposal has been made to adopt the 
multi-attribute value/utility theory in contingent valuation studies (Gregory, 
Lichtenstein and Slovic 1993).
Uncertainties
Value models, such as MAVT and cost-beneﬁ t analysis (CBA) are used in the 
planning of countermeasures in the event of a nuclear accident (IAEA 1994; 
Sinkko 1991). They are inappropriate if major uncertainties are connected with 
the decision, as in nuclear emergency management. In many protective actions 
the consequences of alternatives cannot be predicted with certainty. For example, 
depending on the course of the accident, it is possible that much higher or lower 
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doses than estimated will result, or it is not known how successful the action 
will be. Even if the fallout pattern has been measured, the dose distribution 
could be substantial. The consequence assessment of other attributes is equally 
uncertain. Utility analysis (MAUT) is designed to allow both uncertainties and 
risk to be taken into account. For example, if felt appropriate, it is possible to use 
the individual dose instead of the collective dose in the calculations by considering 
the individual dose distribution. There is also software which makes it possible 
to incorporate distributions into the analysis (Smith 2002). Incorporation of 
uncertainties into an analysis, however, requires an understanding of probabilities 
and - if done in an orthodox way - a series of potentially difﬁ cult questions for 
decision-makers. 
Should any uncertainty exist, an important issue is to distinguish a good 
- analytically premeditated - decision from a desired consequence. Because 
the outcome is uncertain a good decision does not guarantee the realisation of 
the most desired consequence. A decision cannot be qualiﬁ ed based on its true 
consequence (Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa 1999).
Group decisions and facilitated workshops
Decision analysis is based on the preference model of a single decision-maker. 
However, in reality, a decision is rarely taken by a single person, but by a 
group of key players. It is more complex to develop a mathematical model for 
rational group decisions than a mathematical preference model for an individual 
decision-maker (see, for example, French 1988 for more extensive theoretical 
discussion). Indeed, the well-known Arrow’s theorem suggests that for each 
possible arrangement there is a set of individual preferences such that the 
group preference constructed from individual preferences breaks at least one of 
the axioms attached to group behaviour (Arrow 1963, 1984). Nevertheless, it is 
possible to support key players in a manner that can be characterised as useful 
and informative. A fair and just solution to a group decision problem can be found 
only if each member of the group behaves rationally and equitably.
In group decisions as well as in individual decisions decision analysis 
assists key players towards a greater understanding of the problem and the 
preferences of the other members of the group. Furthermore, the analysis guides 
the discussion in a positive and constructive way; there are fewer possibilities to 
jump from one issue to another without direction or progress in the discussion 
(French 1988; Phillips and Phillips 1993). 
A facilitated workshop (also called a decision conferencing) is an interactive 
approach to group decision making in order to generate a shared understanding 
of the problem and to produce a commitment to action. A facilitated workshop 
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combines decision theory, group processes and information technology over an 
intensive, up to two- or three-day session attended by key players with different 
ﬁ elds of expertise. The original arrangement is that a small group of key players 
is seated in a semicircle to discuss the problem through a facilitator who aids 
the group’s discussion and sharing of knowledge. In the background an analyst, 
using decision-aiding technology, models the group’s views (Phillips and Phillips 
1993). 
Phillips argued that decision conferencing produces conditions for creative 
and effective decision-making. Participants are not on home ground (Phillips 
1984). Usually sessions take place in hotels, or in an especially designed room 
on the facilitator’s premises. The group is carefully composed of problem owners 
representing all perspectives of the issue to be resolved. It is recommended 
that the facilitator should be a professional and neutral outsider (Phillips 1984; 
Susskind and Field 1996). 
Decision analysis techniques 
The decision analysis approach in this work is based on multiattribute value 
(MAVT) and - utility (MAUT) theories (Keeney and Raiffa 1976; French 1988). 
The selections were made because these theories are well developed and tested for 
many years and have an axiomatic foundation. These methods are very applicable 
also in facilitated workshops where the purpose is to guide the thinking of key 
players, help them to make consistent judgements and to choose rationally. There 
are other multiattribute evaluation methods such as the analytic hierarchy 
process, fuzzy decision analysis and multiattribute outranking analysis. All these 
theories have proponents and opponents (see e.g. French 1988). 
The cost beneﬁ t analysis (CBA) has also applied in planning of protective 
actions in advance (IAEA 1994; Gjörup et. al 1992). The costs beneﬁ t analysis has 
its basis in economic theory. Typically analysis is prepared to provide decision-
makers with information and do not require decision-makers to express value 
judgements (French 1988). Therefore, the CBA method is not very applicable 
in the workshops where the judgements are performed with the key players. 
The apparent difference is also that in the MAVT the values of attributes are 
converted into common units, whereas in the CBA values are converted into 
monetary terms. All effects are translated to ﬁ nancial values regardless of how 
intangible they might be. This poses problems when human health is the main 
issue. In the workshops some participants pointed that money is not important 
in the decision on protective actions. 
The quality of any decision analysis will depend on how digestible the 
problem is structured and how careful consequences of alternatives have been 
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pondered. The decision problems, which are deliberated and judged carefully, 
the outcome of a decision analysis from all evaluation method could well be the 
same. The prerequisite is that all pertinent attributes, action alternatives and 
trade-offs are judged equally. This is not likely to be true if risk attitude of a 
decision-maker is a major issue. In that case the MAUT analysis offers a reliable 
method to manage the problem.
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3 Objectives of the study
The overall objective of this study is to develop methods and techniques to 
evaluate systematically protective action strategies in such a way that all key 
players’ concerns and issues could be considered openly and taken equally into 
account in the decision taken (Hämäläinen et al. 1998, Hämäläinen et al. 2000, 
VI; Ammann et al. 2001, VII). An important outcome of the work is the creation 
of preconditions for participatory decision-making in the event of a nuclear 
accident (Sinkko et. al. 2004, I). The speciﬁ c objectives are:
• to plan analytically countermeasures with all pertinent key players. 
International organisations have also recommended analysis of protective 
actions on a national basis; 
• to deﬁ ne the generic attributes that have to be considered when setting 
intervention levels. Only a few analyses exist where all important 
attributes and their relative importance for the decision taken have been 
considered and discussed explicitly (Aumonier and French 1992; French 
et. al. 1996; International Chernobyl Project 1991; Sinkko 1991; Zeevaert 
et. al. 2001); 
• to study how the area, timing and duration of an action should be deﬁ ned 
in order to maximise the reduction in radiation detriment and at the same 
time to minimise the detriment associated with the intervention; 
• to study how single protective actions can be bundled into overall strategies 
in the affected area. Although protective actions could be optimised 
independently from each other, in practice the actions are dependent or 
sequential, e.g., agricultural countermeasures are dependent on evacuation 
and relocation. The dependence or sequence might inﬂ uence on value tree 
or value trade-offs; 
• to study and develop the applicability of decision support systems for 
different situations. In the early hours of an accident there is hardly time 
to model the decision to be taken; rather the decision has to be based on 
intervention levels studied and considered beforehand and on guidance 
given by a decision support system (DSS). In the later phase of an accident, 
however, there is time and need to perform detailed and more speciﬁ c 
analyses;
• to study how uncertainties could be incorporated into nuclear emergency 
management. In the early hours of an accident uncertainties are dominant, 
concealing factors which might become apparent in the later hours of the 
accident. There are also large variations, e.g., in the health consequences 
for the population.
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4 Materials and methods
In this study a series of facilitated workshops have been organised in the Nordic 
countries to analyse protective actions and to develop methods for key player 
participation in the event of a nuclear accident. The workshops were jointly 
arranged by the RISØ National Laboratory, the STUK - Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority and the University of Leeds (UoL), in Denmark in 1992, and 
by STUK, RISØ, NRPA (the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority), SSI 
(the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute) and UoL in Sweden in 1995, and 
by STUK and the Helsinki University of Technology in Finland in 1997, 1998, 
1999 and 2001. STUK was responsible for the co-ordination, development of 
the accident scenarios, consequence assessments and for contacts with the 
key players. The University of Leeds and Helsinki University of Technology 
were responsible for the decision modelling, the analysis approaches and the 
implementation of the decision support software as well as for the facilitation 
of the workshops. 
The Nordic co-operation organisation (NKS Nordic Nuclear Safety Research) 
funded the ﬁ rst two workshops held in Denmark and Sweden (French et. al. 1993, 
IV and 1996). The members of these workshops were local government ofﬁ cials, 
emergency planners and members of the radiation protection community from 
all the Nordic countries. The two subsequent workshops and decision analysis 
interview were conducted within the fourth Framework Programme of the EU 
(Hämäläinen et. al., 1998, and 2000, VI). The last workshop was funded by Finnish 
sources consisting of the Foodstuffs Industry Pool, the National Emergency 
Supply Agency and Valio Ltd (Ammann et. al. 2001, VII). 
Within the NKS the KAN-2-project was performed in 1994, the purpose 
of which was to provide basic data and methodology to improve the planning 
of protective actions in the event of nuclear accidents. Special attention was 
paid to the tail-end topics of the clean-up process; management and disposal of 
radioactive waste. As part of this project decision analysis was performed in which 
recovery operations to clean up a forest environment were analysed and discussed 
to determine appropriate intervention levels in a hypothetical nuclear accident 
to protect the public, workers and the environment (Sinkko et. al. 1994, V). 
The work is based on case studies where the key players were invited 
to consider a scenario of a hypothetical but realistic nuclear accident. It was 
assumed that a core-damage and containment leak accident had occurred at a 
nuclear power plant, leading to contamination of the environment. To increase 
realisticness, in most cases the accident sequence was taken from probabilistic 
reactor safety studies (PSA) performed by the NPP and STUK safety experts. It 
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was also considered important that the current emergency management process 
of the administration was followed closely and that all relevant key players were 
represented at the meetings. Contacts were made and preparatory meetings held 
prior to workshops, as would be the case in a real situation.
Several protective actions and the bundle of actions, i.e. strategies, were 
selected to be considered in the workshops. The workshop held in Denmark considered 
countermeasures in a situation where early phase protective actions had been taken 
and decisions on later phase protective actions were to be considered (French et al. 
1993, IV). The main issue was to consider whether to relocate people in certain areas. 
The theme in the second Nordic workshops was the decision on clean-up actions in 
inhabited areas (French et. al., 1996). The ﬁ rst Finnish workshops focused on early 
phase countermeasures, i.e. iodine tablets, sheltering and evacuation (Hämäläinen 
et. al. 1998). The attributes and their deﬁ nition related to the decision of early 
phase protective actions were studied in depth. The incorporation of uncertainty 
into emergency management was studied in these workshops and in the interview 
analysis (Hämäläinen et. al. 2000, VI). The task of the last workshop was to plan 
countermeasures to reduce the dose received from consumption of dairy products 
contaminated by radionuclides (Ammann et. al. 2001, VII).
The simulation of the radiological situation and the generation of 
countermeasure strategies, together with the assessment of their consequences, 
were done in advance. The participants were given an information package 
comprising thematic maps of the radiological situation showing an animation of 
the dispersion, dose values and assessments of health and economic consequences. 
The information was also provided in the form of consequence tables. The possible 
precautionary actions taken to protect the population were mentioned. A list of 
predeﬁ ned attributes, the parties involved in decision-making and their duties were 
attached. All in all, the package was designed to contain all the relevant information 
necessary for the participants to understand the accident situation and to be able 
to take an informed decision on the countermeasures to be recommended to formal 
decision-makers.
At the beginning of the workshops the list of attributes was presented 
and introduced for discussion. The participants were urged to go through, revise, 
remove, add and redeﬁ ne any attribute they wished. During the whole discussion 
the attribute hierarchy was displayed and suggested changes were incorporated 
on the ﬂ y. Eventually the group agreed on the ﬁ nal set of attributes. The ‘hard’ 
attributes, i.e. the number of cancer cases and costs were calculated in advance, but 
the ‘soft’ attributes such as social disruption and anxiety, were directly rated during 
the workshops. A decision model was constructed and value or utility analyses were 
performed, including sensitivity analysis with commercially available software. At 
the end of the workshops the results were discussed.
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5 Results and discussion
5.1 Emergency planning 
The workshops aimed to elicit justiﬁ ed protective actions or their combination, 
i.e. strategies of which the scale, timing and duration were optimised in the given 
situation (optimisation in the sense of radiation protection). Decision analysis has 
been developed to evaluate and identify the best strategy, i.e. to rank strategies 
but the term justiﬁ cation is not used in the OR. The justiﬁ cation of actions is 
conceptually clear but not easily measured. The ranking of countermeasures 
embodies many value judgements such as the assessment the importance of 
attributes. If all possible alternatives are considered, the best ranked option 
should also be justiﬁ ed. Thus the justiﬁ cation is implicitly included in the decision 
analysis. In traditional vocabulary, the best ranked protective action is justiﬁ ed 
and optimised. (Sinkko et. al. 2004, I). 
International organisations deﬁ ne justiﬁ cation slightly differently. 
Attributes are most often seen to have either a positive or negative quality; 
more is better than less (positive) or less is better than more (negative). In 
nuclear emergency management, avertable dose and reassurance for instance 
are positive, while anxiety and monetary costs are negative. For the justiﬁ cation 
process the quality of attributes should be agreed and the relative importance 
of attributes, i.e. their weights, be judged. Relevant value for weighting is the 
difference between the value of an attribute in the action under consideration 
and in the worst action, not its conceptual value. An action which aggregated sum 
of weighted values is positive is justiﬁ ed. A simpliﬁ ed example of justiﬁ cation 
is given in ﬁ gure 1. 
The judgement of the relative importance of attributes is not a task of the 
radiation protection community. It contains the judgement, how much society 
should invest its resources to health care and, particularly in this context, to 
avoid radiation risk. The overall justiﬁ cation and optimisation might show that 
resources are more needed for other health care purposes, and protective actions 
are not justiﬁ ed. The radiation protection community has a responsibility to be 
aware of the amount of resources it would be appropriate to allocate to reduce 
radiation risk, to be comparable to other reductions in the health risk and to 
hand this information on to formal decision-makers along with transparent 
recommendation.
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Figure 1. Principled justiﬁ cation of three actions considering four attributes. The height of 
the bars illustrates their relative importance in the decision. The bar on the far right (blue 
bar) is the aggregated, summed up net beneﬁ t in each action. In action one avertable 
dose, costs and reassurance have been considered with a value of zero. Action two is 
justiﬁ ed.
The relative importance of attributes is subjective and no universal values 
exist (Sinkko et. al. 1994, V). The values are related to the unique problem and 
they change according to opinions and resources. As a consequence, intervention 
levels based on generic planning or case studies are very rough and their 
applicability to a new situation should be veriﬁ ed.
There should be a clear understanding of the countermeasures and factors 
affecting the decisions. The timing, duration and target area of actions, and the 
group aimed to be protected by the actions could be quite easily assessed and 
should be clearly deﬁ ned. The objectives and attributes are not self-evident. 
In workshops much time was spent on deﬁ ning factors and wording used in 
value elicitation. Especially intangible attributes such as anxiety, reassurance 
can commonly be interpreted differently. It seems to be beneﬁ cial to deﬁ ne the 
attributes in advance in order to save time and to guarantee that all key players 
understand their meaning in the same way. The deﬁ nition of attributes in advance 
is contrary to the standard way of using decision analysis and possibly leads to 
such biases as availability or anchoring. Value assessments could thus be based on 
information that is visualised and useful modiﬁ cations in attributes are not made. 
For example, if anxiety is available in the list it might be given too much weight 
or technical feasibility omitted if not mentioned. However, nuclear accidents 
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are rare and key players are not very familiar with the radiological issues or 
related terminology. It was found that in order to harmonise the discussion it is 
practical and efﬁ cient to start with a predeﬁ ned, preliminary model of attributes 
(Sinkko et. al. 2004, I). The participants were asked to ﬁ ll in questionnaire after 
the workshops in order to ﬁ nd out their opinions on the decision analysis and 
the workshop method. The questionnaire conﬁ rmed that the participants were 
rather satisﬁ ed with the predeﬁ ned attributes and ensured that all relevant 
factors were included in the model (Ammann et. al. 2001, VII). 
The following set of generic attributes has been deliberated upon with the 
insight gained during this work (Ammann et. al. 2001, VII; French et. al. 1993, IV; 
French et. al. 1996; Hämäläinen et. al. 1998; Hämäläinen et al. 2000, VI; Sinkko 
et. al. 1994, V). Although attributes are elicited in different case studies covering 
early as well later phase actions such as evacuation, milk pathway, clean-up and 
forest, attribute validity in a new situation should be veriﬁ ed:
Collective dose to the public. The standard assumption within the radiation 
protection community is that exposure to radiation increases the risk of cancer, 
however small the exposure. If the individual risk is very small, stochastic 
health effects are still expected when large population groups are exposed. 
This attribute could be measured as the projected collective dose to the public 
(manSv). It could also be converted into the expected number of fatal cancer cases 
or number of cancer incidents to be more comprehensible for persons outside the 
radiation protection community. A risk factor or nominal probability coefﬁ cient 
for stochastic effects of 5 x 10-2 per Sv could be used to assess the probability 
for fatal cancers (IRCP 1991). Excepting thyroid cancers, it could be assumed 
that roughly half of the cancer cases can be cured, i.e. there are twice as many 
incidents as fatal cases. A ﬁ gure to be calculated with a DSS as an input in 
the decision-making process could be estimations of the additional number of 
cancer cases or collective doses with and without countermeasure options (i.e. 
avertable doses). 
Individual dose to the public. Some members of the public might be 
subject to a relatively high stochastic risk or be at risk of incurring deterministic 
effects (the critical group could be deﬁ ned as in Basic Safety Standards, IAEA 
1996). Their risk has to be considered individually and can be measured by the 
individual dose. It is worth noting that there is a correlation between collective 
and individual dose attributes if both are used in a decision analysis (Sinkko et. 
al. 1994, V). This attribute could be measured with effective external dose and/or 
organ dose in normal living conditions and when an action is taken integrated 
over the action period (e.g. sheltering or evacuation time, units in mSv). 
Number of thyroid cancers in children. Thyroid cancer deserved special 
consideration because it is predominantly children that are affected. In addition, 
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thyroid cancer, which has a latency time of only a few years, is rare and is 
easily seen in statistics. The better response to treatment of thyroid cancer is 
another aspect that needs expression, i.e. roughly 10% of thyroid cancers prove 
fatal, whereas on average an assumed 50% of all other types of cancer cause 
premature death. The risk factor to calculate the number of fatal thyroid cancer 
cases is 0.08 x 10-2 per Gy (ICRP 1991). A ﬁ gure to be calculated: thyroid dose 
in children from intake of radioiodine in normal living conditions and when an 
action is taken (mGy). 
Number of thyroid cancers in adults. A breakdown of the number of thyroid 
cancer cases into those expected in children and those in an adult population 
might be useful. A similar breakdown for other cancer types might also be helpful. 
A ﬁ gure to be calculated: thyroid dose in adults from intake of radioiodine in 
normal living conditions and when an action is taken (mGy). 
Dose to the workers. Projected individual dose received by the workers 
carrying out protective actions generally outdoors (mSv). If large numbers of 
emergency service employees are exposed to radiation (e.g., during clean-up 
actions) the increased number of expected fatal cancer cases in the group or 
their collective dose could also be used as an attribute (manSv). Dose limits to 
workers have to be observed. A ﬁ gure to be calculated: effective external, organ- 
and/or skin dose during work hours (mSv). 
Statistical non-radiation fatalities. The collective physical risk is largely 
dependent on the number of people affected by protective actions and it may 
not be much higher than the risk associated with normal human activities. For 
example, it has been concluded that the health risk introduced by stable iodine 
prophylaxis, prolonged sheltering or evacuation is very low (Aumonier and 
Morrey 1990). Since there is only sparse information on accidents caused by other 
countermeasures, the general statistics could be used as an initial approximation 
for other countermeasures, e.g. for the risk of road accidents during evacuation. 
This attribute could be measured as the number of fatalities or reduced life 
expectancy in the alternatives considered.
Individual non-radiation fatalities. In some accident scenarios there might 
be a population group that is at higher risk of suffering death in the course of 
taking countermeasures. It might be important to consider individual risks, for 
example, when evacuating the young, the elderly or patients in very bad weather 
conditions, since evacuation under such circumstances might endanger their 
lives. This attribute could be measured as the number of fatalities or reduced 
life expectancy.
Social disruption. An accident and how it is reacted to, poses a severe 
threat to the industry and primary production. Firstly, there would be loss of 
income, for example, due to direct restrictions in selling products that exceed the 
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maximum permitted concentration or contamination levels. But then consumers 
may also react unpredictably and reject all products that are somehow related to 
the affected area. Exports may suffer from a total loss of conﬁ dence in a country’s 
products. All this amounts to a threat to posed to producers and employees in 
industry, and the subsequent loss of their livelihood can cause social disruptions. 
Evacuation or relocation may break down the social network, which cause 
disruptions. Direct rating of alternatives. 
Anxiety of the population. Anxiety could be deﬁ ned to be a combination 
of fear and the emotions of sadness, guilt, anger and shame. (Izard 1977). The 
majority of the persons living in the contaminated area may show varying 
degrees of psychological reactions in response to an accident (e.g. miscarriage of 
unborn children). But stress may also be introduced by the protective actions. The 
severity of an accident is likely to be perceived through the protective measures 
taken, i.e. the more extensive these are, the more severe the accident must be 
and consequently the higher the health risk. Direct rating of alternatives.
Reassurance of the population. In the long run, appropriate and reasonable 
extensive actions may reassure the people living in the affected area. Especially 
measures that people can implement themselves are most effective in reducing 
stress. Direct rating of alternatives. 
Anxiety of the workers. Emergency actions will cause stress among workers 
who are implementing them. Direct rating of alternatives.
Environmental issues. Protective actions may remedy or insult the living 
conditions of ﬂ ora and fauna. Environmental issues may be related to speciﬁ c 
countermeasures, for example, waste management in clean-up actions may cause 
environmental damages whereas clean-up itself may improve the situation. Direct 
rating or another numerical value depending on the case.
Social feasibility. Some actions may not be perceived as adequate (slightly 
contaminated foodstuffs), restrictive or even not accepted (relocation). People are 
not ready to follow recommendations which are against their wishes or attitudes. 
Direct rating of alternatives.
Technical feasibility. Technical feasibility is understood in relation to deﬁ ned 
quality or quantity. This attribute is in many cases a constraint preventing the 
implementation of an action. Large cities can hardly be evacuated and sheltering, 
too is difﬁ cult. In some cases actions may differ in their feasibility, e.g., sheltering 
is more feasible than evacuation in bad weather conditions. Direct rating or 
another numerical value depending on the case.
Flexibility of strategies. There may be substantial uncertainties in 
consequence assessment and therefore it should be possible to modify strategies 
as more information is collected. Direct rating of alternatives.
Monetary Costs. This attribute might contain the direct and indirect costs 
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of protective actions. Cancer treatment costs, associated loss of GDP, and other 
costs that are proportional to the number of cancers should not be included in 
this attribute in order to avoid double counting. Monetary unit.
Risk studies have suggested that perceived risk and related attributes 
(e.g. conﬁ dence) might be major factors in the ﬁ nal decision-making in policy 
problems (National Research Council 1989). Conﬁ dence in authorities is often 
thought to be of crucial importance for risk perception in an expert organisation. 
Recent studies, however, have shown only a weak relationship between conﬁ dence 
and risk perception. A much stronger correlation has been found between risk 
perception and unknown effects (Sjöberg 2001). Contrary to the opinion of experts, 
politicians and members of the public believe that there are many unknown 
effects that are not yet understood but still affect their risk perception and 
consequently their behaviour, for instance, as consumers. These types of attributes 
were not considered in the workshops. Expert organisations should, however, be 
aware of the reasons why perceived risk and related attributes might be added 
in ﬁ nal policy decisions. Attributes, such as ‘conﬁ dence’ and ‘unknown effects’, 
which would increase the intervention level, should thus be kept in mind but not 
considered on the expert level while preparing recommendations.
Political objectives and attributes might be part of decision-making on 
protective actions but they need to be clearly deﬁ ned. Politics is by deﬁ nition 
activity directed to social matters, a programme or procedure and it could not be 
as such a measurable attribute. Politicians and authorities write and maintain 
political programmes and the deﬁ nition and incorporation of these attributes in 
the decision-making process is their natural task.
One objective of this study has been to analyse protective actions on a 
national basis and derive national interventions levels. Therefore it was stressed 
that the intervention levels recommended by international organisations should 
be forgotten for a while in the workshops. However, some intervention levels, 
e.g. radionuclide concentrations in foodstuffs should have been considered in 
the workshops because of their mandatory status as EU regulation. It cannot 
be deducted from the result of their overall inﬂ uence on the intervention levels 
derived in this work. International recommendations are important reference 
levels and will be compared in a real situation.  
Although the number of actions considered in the workshops do not 
cover all possible actions some, remarks on intervention levels could be made. 
The calculated intervention levels are given in Table I. More countermeasures 
were considered than is given in the table, but in the method applied here 
the intervention level could be recalculated only for the best ranked action. 
In addition, taking into account the time constraints in the workshops it was 
impossible to undertake a systematic analysis to derive optimal intervention 
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levels for the accident scenario. More ﬂ exible tools to modify protective actions 
and assess their consequences would have been needed, too. 
Table I. Intervention levels in terms of averted dose derived from results of workshops 
compared with the levels recommended by ICRP, IAEA and EU. The IAEA and EU levels 
for milk are generic action levels and maximum permitted levels, respectively.
Derived from 
workshops 
ICRP IAEA EU
Iodine pro-
phylaxis 
10 - 100 mGy 
0.7 - 1.4 mGy 1, 6)
50 - 500 mSv   100 mGy some tens to a 
few hundreds 
mGy 
Sheltering 0.5 - 5mSv/24h 
1 - 2 mSv/12h1, 6)
5 - 50 mSv/day 10 mSv/  
< 2 days 
a few to few 
tens mSv 
Evacuation 10 mSv/month 
2)
5 - 50 mSv 3)
50 - 500 mSv/  
< 1 week 
50 mSv/  
< 1 week 
a few tens to a 
few hundreds 
mSv 
Milk
131
I
50 Bq/kg 5, 6) 10 mSv/ 1 year 7)
1000 - 10 000 
Bq/kg 
100 Bq/kg  500 Bq/kg  
Milk
!37
Cs
100 Bq/kg 5, 6) 10 mSv/ 1 year 7)
1000 - 10 000 
Bq/kg 
1000 Bq/kg  1000 Bq/kg  
1) Early release phase with uncertainties. Assessment is based on certainty equivalent value 
2) Individual dose in the first month. Evacuation was planned for six months and avertable 
dose estimation was 22 mSv. 
3 Evacuation time was not considered 
5 Provision of uncontaminated fodder or upgrading milk to cheese or butter to protect the 
milk pathway.  
6) Action level. 
7)
Restriction to a single foodstuff. 
The analysis of the milk pathway nevertheless suggests that countermeasures at 
concentration levels a decade below internationally recommended intervention 
levels can be justiﬁ ed in certain accident scenarios (Ammann et al. 2001, VII). 
The banning and disposal of milk was never considered optimal. Banning would 
create an enormous disposal problem and the legal aspects of such a measure 
are unclear. No emergency plans exist for the dumping of large amounts of 
contaminated substances such as milk or milk powder, processing water or 
grass. Milk is produced daily and is difﬁ cult to store; and therefore any alarming 
contamination of milk would consequently call for an almost immediate decision. 
For these reasons it was suspected that the disposal of milk was not a feasible 
option at all. 
Understanding uncertainties and determining the risk marginal is 
problematic. During the pre- and release phases of an accident the released 
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amount of radionuclides is the main source of uncertainty. The range could be 
several orders of magnitude. The consequence tables of 5, 50 and 95 per cent 
release fractiles were calculated and shown to the participants in the workshops. 
Many participants were not familiar with decision analysis and some did not 
feel comfortable with modelling tools and had problems in understanding the 
procedures how uncertainties were incorporated in the analysis. It is likely that 
the 95% fractile had a strong inﬂ uence on their decision and as a consequence the 
action levels in Table I are lower than might be expected from the normative utility 
analysis. In the workshops there was not enough time to explain in detail the 
utility analysis. A way forward to incorporate uncertainties in nuclear emergency 
management is to perform the utility analysis in advance and scrutinise it in 
the workshop.
Many times in the workshops it was pointed out that the way the public 
is informed about the accident and the countermeasures taken are crucial 
(French et. al. 1993 IV; Hämäläinen et. al. 1998). People’s reactions depend on 
what information they are given and how they interpret the situation. In risk 
communication the goal cannot only be to make the messages more effective by 
improving the understandability and the credibility of those who disseminate 
information (National Research Council 1989). Such an approach might serve 
their interests but could degrade the overall quality. Good risk communication 
helps the recipients to solve their problems at the same time. People need 
timely delivered clear, understandable and unambiguous information in order 
to cope with situation (Eränen 1997). Decision analysis will help to reveal this 
information because its focus is in decision-making. It is important not to conceal 
pertinent information and knowledge that is needed for decision-making in an 
emergency (Susskind and Field 1996). It is equally important to tell what is 
known and what is not known and not to speculate. 
 5.2 Decision analysis
It is important to learn where in the decision-making process decision support 
in the form of a workshop would be appropriate. Facilitated workshops do not ﬁ t 
comfortably in the representative decision-making process as a forum for making 
ﬁ nal decisions concerning many key players (French et. al. 1996). Preparation 
of a decision is often divided into so many phases carried out by so many people 
that a single decision-making point cannot be identiﬁ ed. In a workshop a single 
decision-making point is presupposed. Commonly, elected ofﬁ cials and authorities 
do not participate in consequence assessment or in the preparation or evaluation 
of a decision; instead they expect prepared advice from experts (Apostolakis 
and Pickett 1998, Lowry, Adler and Milner 1997; Sauri 2002). After the Nordic 
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workshop held in 1995, the Lord Mayor of Helsinki and the former Minister 
stressed that higher level ofﬁ cials desire advice as to both alternative actions 
and the grounds for a decision (Siitonen 1995). 
Experience gained from this work supports the view that facilitated 
workshops ﬁ t well into the planning phase in a decision-making process where 
the key players with expertise in different areas evaluate the options to be given 
for ﬁ nal debate before the formal decision is taken (cf. Fig 2). The decision-maker’s 
control of optimisation is ideal. In practice she or he would rather wait, avoid the 
commitment to the outcome and take distance if necessary (Renn et. al 1995). A 
common problem with all participatory methods is that there is no interaction 
between the key players’ group and politicians or higher level authorities. The 
input could be improved by the analytical process, and by a fair and competent 
stakeholder group, but it could not be thought that careful input would overcome 
political forces. 
Time is limited with the key players, too and a two-day facilitated workshop 
as proposed by researchers (see, e.g. Phillips 1993, French 1988) does not ﬁ t 
always comfortably with the decision-making process in practice. Spontaneous 
decision conferencing could solve the time constraints (Hämäläinen et. al. 1995). 
This study supports the view that if the information is in the proper form the 
workshop could be carried out in a shorter time. Prior to the optimisation process, 
preparatory meetings and discussion with different key players might be needed 
to collect information and sound out views on the problem. It is also seen to 
be important to establish face-to-face dialogue with the victims of an accident 
(Dubreuil 1999; Susskind and ﬁ eld 1996).
Decision on protective actions could affect large sections of the population 
and have important social and psychological impacts. The decisions taken need 
to be explained and justiﬁ ed and will be subject to scrutiny for a long time 
afterwards (Hämäläinen et. al. 1998 and 2000, II). Decision analysis could assist 
in this process. During the analysis, protective actions are deﬁ ned, and the 
consequences and their importance are assessed, which would provide a way of 
explaining the actions taken and actions omitted. The majority of participants felt 
that formal analysis provides transparent decision-making that can be utilised 
for this purpose. The primary beneﬁ t of the decision analysis could be improved 
understanding and communication (Kadvany 1995).
The participants were asked to ﬁ ll in questionnaire after the workshops 
in order to ﬁ nd out their opinions on the decision analysis and the workshop 
method. All the participants considered the workshops useful, and most of them 
also thought that a similar approach could be valuable for training and exercises. 
The attitude towards its application in the event of a real emergency was slightly 
more reserved, but in general still positive. The suitability in an early phase of 
an accident was rated the lowest. 
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Key players
Facilitated workshop, overall optimisation
Decision-makers
Formal decision
Advice, open
debate, set up opinion
Experts
Preparatory meetings
Expert organisations
Collection of information:
health, social, psychology, environment, economy etc
Figure 2.  A schematic view of an ideal committee type decision-making process 
applicable in representative decision-making process.
The impression is that the participants were not very familiar with this 
type of analytical approach and opinions were divided for and against. Some 
found that the beneﬁ ts were obvious but some did not feel comfortable with the 
modelling tools and had problems in understanding of the procedures such as 
weighting of attribute scales and utility analysis. The deﬁ nition of the attributes 
and the countermeasures, and decision table were easily adopted. One reason 
why some were reluctant to decision analysis might be that they were expecting 
a recurrent decision-making process where experience is available. This attitude 
43
STUK-A207
not to seek judgemental support has been observed also in other workshops 
(Bartzis et. al. 1999, III). This kind of method had been seldom applied in radiation 
protection and before the workshop there was no training for participants. Only a 
few hours were spent on the issues and consequently there was not enough time 
to explain in detail all the decision analytical methods used during the workshops. 
In future new applications of the approach to appropriate problems are likely to 
increase acceptance and understanding of the techniques. The applicability of 
decision analysis could also be improved by avoiding the excessive veriﬁ cation 
of theoretical correctness, which is often difﬁ cult to understand by participants. 
The procedural correctness of the decision analysis is left to be taken care of by 
a facilitator. 
The most difﬁ cult part of the analysis was the elicitation of the risk 
attitudes as required in theory when facing uncertainties (Hämäläinen et. al. 
2000, VI; Bartzis et. al. 1999, III). The lottery questions were asked in order to 
establish the form of the utility functions. It was clear that most participants 
had problems perceiving the idea of utility function. Using lotteries seemed 
too abstract and the questions too difﬁ cult for the participants in order to be 
able to give meaningful answers. The outline of the analysis could be prepared 
in preceding meetings and given in the information package. This could lead 
to an anchoring bias, but if a technique how to deal with uncertainties is not 
understood the result of the analysis might prove useless. In practice, a good 
approximation to a full utility analysis is to use multi-attribute values evaluated 
at the expectations of the attributes (French 1996, Stewart 1995). Although 
subjective the expectations values could be better understood that hypothetical 
lotteries. 
The choice of action was strongly inﬂ uenced by trade-offs. Because of 
its importance the method needs further improvements. Swing weighting is 
recommended as an assessment method for the trade-offs (Von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards 1986). The decision-maker is asked to compare a pair of hypothetical 
actions which differ only in their values along two attribute scales. In the 
workshops, however, it was found that hypothetical options needed clariﬁ cation 
and did not suit well to the problem at hand. It would be more logical to ask 
directly how much more important an attribute range is compared to another’s 
range of values, as was done in the ﬁ rst workshop in Denmark (French et. al. 
1993, IV). The Even swap method could also be applied (Hämäläinen et. al. 
2003). This is a form of bartering where the values of attributes are changed 
so that one attribute will have the same value in all alternatives (Hammond et 
al, 1999). If all alternatives are rated equally for a given attribute, it could be 
ignored. The method could be applied iteratively and eliminate attributes until 
a clear choice emerges. 
44
STUK-A207
In a workshop we observed a high trade-off of 10 million € per averted cancer 
death. This amount of expenditure is clearly outside the range recommended by 
international organisations, i.e. 0.05 - 1.8 million € per averted cancer death (3000 
- 100,000 US$ per manSv, see e.g. ICRP 1993; IAEA 1994). Another viewpoint 
has been presented by Keeney (1994). All costs would eventually be passed on 
to the general public. Environmental regulations may include lower wages, 
higher taxes and, ultimately, less income available for health care, nutrients 
etc. According to the estimation of Keeney (1994) based on life expectancy and 
GNP in different countries, roughly 10 million € paid for regulation will cause 
one statistical fatality. There was not much discussion on this speciﬁ c trade-off, 
so it cannot be stated whether the participants would truly be willing to suggest 
this kind of an investment (Hämäläinen et. al 1998). 
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6 Conclusions
The objective of this work was to plan systematically countermeasures in advance 
and to develop methods to include objectives of all key players in the decision. New 
theoretical methods were utilised and demands for open group decision-making 
were considered and tested in the workshops. The developed method applied 
employs a group process where responsibility is placed on the participants to 
assimilate information and to provide judgements. It has a clear structure based 
on the theory of the Decision Analysis which provides reasoning and learning 
framework that intertwines the beliefs, preferences and value judgements of 
the participants and achieves a transparent ranking of the strategies available. 
Decision analysis had a major role in facilitated workshops. It guided focused 
discussions and offered a structured way to tackle the problem. An important 
feature was also that it allowed participants to try different judgements to see 
the consequences without a ﬁ nal commitment. This allowed them to re-evaluate 
their opinions. The applied facilitated workshop method was considered to ﬁ t in 
accustomed decision-making process, to offer a forum for constructive dialogue 
and to be open, equitable and auditable.
Decisions which concern a wide section of the population should be open 
and transparent (McDaniels et. al. 1999; Sauri 2002; Susskind 1996). One ﬁ nding 
of this work is that transparency and communication could be clearly increased 
by applying the structured approach of decision analysis (Sinkko et.al. 2004, I). 
The decision-making process was made fairer and more competent by involving 
key players as has been proposed by, e.g., Renn et. al. (1995). The participation 
of key players increases the cost and complexity of the process, and the decision 
where to stop a participatory, analytical regime has to be made by seeking a 
balance between accuracy, time and resources. There is no need for analytical 
approach in recurrent decisions. People are accustomed to routine, repeated 
decisions where experience is available. Rare, complex problems such as large 
protective actions could evidently beneﬁ t from a facilitated workshop based on 
decision analysis. 
The decision analytical approach offers a suitable framework to aggregate 
values, beliefs and preferences that are held by the different interest groups. 
In the case studies it helped the participants to tackle the problem in a logical 
and efﬁ cient manner. For example, when constructing the attribute or objective 
hierarchy, the key players were encouraged to think about all the factors that 
are important to them in this context. An important achievement of the induced 
discussion was that many deﬁ nitions were clariﬁ ed and others revised. But 
probably even more important was that it created a common understanding of 
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the decision problem (Sinkko et. al. 2004, I). At a later stage, the participants 
were asked to consider explicitly the necessary trade-offs between the attributes. 
The given preference statements revealed the perceived importance of each 
attribute in relation to all the others. Thus, the analysis did not merely yield 
a ranking of the strategies investigated; it also revealed the reasoning behind 
them. The primary beneﬁ t of decision analysis is the improved understanding 
and risk communication. This is important because the decision taken needs 
to be explained and justiﬁ ed afterwards. In addition, it increases the level of 
commitment that is needed from all interest groups to carry out effectively any 
intervention agreed upon.
Susskind and Field (1996) have argued that face-to-face negotiation among 
key players could be the only way to settle the acceptable level of risk. The 
experiment conducted by Arvai (2003) supports this view. In the participatory 
decision-making process people were more supportive of the resulting risky 
decisions than participants in the control group. The risk was also perceived as 
being lower and the beneﬁ t higher in the participatory group. The process was 
seen to be fair, reasonable and amenable, allowing key players to announce their 
views and concerns. Slovic (1997) has argued that risk management could be 
developed by involving public in the process instead of trying to increase trust and 
to improve the communication. The experience gained in the workshops strongly 
supports this view, notably the latest workshop where the risk communication 
issues were discussed with the participants (Sinkko et. al, 2004). 
The workshops method conforms to the basic principles in nuclear 
emergency management i.e., justiﬁ cation and optimisation of protective actions as 
is stated by international organisations. It also exempliﬁ ed that the chosen setting 
can be fruitfully applied to the planning of early as well as later phase protective 
actions in advance. The participants considered workshops and decision analysis 
techniques applicable during the later phase in a potential real situation. Its 
suitability was not rated as high as for planning in advance. The applicability 
for the early phase, which is very intense and rapidly developing, had the lowest 
rating. 
The realistic nature and the disciplined process of a facilitated workshop 
and commitment in decision-making yielded understanding as to what 
information should be collected and in what form. It was found to be important 
that information collected and given to key players is in the proper form for 
decision-making as is described in Decision Analysis (Hämäläinen et al. 2000, 
VI; Ammann et al. 2001, VII). The aggregation of unstructured information could 
easily result in a collection of views which cannot be utilised in the decision-
making process. 
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Experts are tempted to do research and publish the results in a form 
suited to scientiﬁ c reporting rather than adapted to decision-making. They may 
resist providing any results at all until they are deﬁ nitive enough to withstand 
peer scrutiny (Brown 2003). However, experience suggests that with insufﬁ cient 
information a facilitated workshop conducted early on will guide and focus 
subsequent research and collection of data. Every workshop has made proposals 
for research topics and data collection (Hämäläinen et al. 1998, V; Hämäläinen et 
al. 2000, VI; Ammann et al. 2001, VII). As a consequence, a workshop could reduce 
collecting masses of data that will make no difference to any decision. Technical 
meetings or the stakeholder networks could shed light on information needed 
in decision-making. However, the ﬁ nal weight on the importance of information 
could be obtained after the trade-offs have been made. It indicates the topics 
which are most important in decision-making and shows where allocation of 
resources to research would be most beneﬁ cial. One explanation of the observed 
poor adequacy of consequence assessment data for decision-making is that reactor 
accidents are rare. This allows experts to be insensitive to decision-makers’ 
interests and the ﬂ aw to be revealed (Brown 2003).
The information package to be given for decision-makers should comprise 
technical information to help to understand the accident scenario and selected 
information on how to make a reasonable choice between alternative actions. 
During this work much insight was gained in objectives and attributes people 
consider in deciding on protective actions. This was achieved by writing down 
the deﬁ nitions of attribute before preparatory meetings and workshops and 
showing them to the co-workers and participants of the workshops. This helped 
communication and saved time in workshops (Hämäläinen et. al. 2000, II). 
Because in an accident so many technical issues have to be coped with, it would 
also be reasonable to prepare more material for workshops than is recommended 
in the Decision Analysis. The Decision Analysis assumes that participants are 
the problem owners i.e., familiar with the issues. That is not necessary the case 
in nuclear emergency management. For example, it was found useful to prepare 
material on health risks similar to radiation (Sinkko et. al. 2004). A skeleton 
of a decision model with a tentative ranking of options could be sent to the 
participants beforehand. In workshops the model could be discussed and revised. 
The judgements given should be clear and open to debate. This view, which is 
also supported by research, that even when all aspects of all alternatives are 
fully described, people have difﬁ culties in making explicit trade-offs themselves 
(Gregory, Lichtenstein and Slovic 1993). 
The work revealed the need to further develop the methods to assess 
the radiological and cost implications of countermeasures realistically. The 
models are typically able to calculate areas of deposition, the fallout pattern 
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and rough radionuclide concentrations in foodstuffs. That helps to cope with the 
situation, but the information is not in the form needed for decision-making. In 
order to provide more realistic consequence assessments it is necessary to take 
production, economic, demographic and geographical information into account. 
Also, feasibility and constraints, such as logistics and legislation of protective 
actions, were found to need further investigation. No regulations or plans seem 
to exist in the EU or in the Nordic countries to dispose of radioactive waste that 
may result from decontamination or other protective actions.
Decontamination, disposal of contaminated products such as milk, grass, 
ﬂ y ash, and compensation for property and products after a nuclear accident may 
raise legal questions (French et. al. 1996; Ammann et. al. 2001, VII). Nuclear 
energy acts, the radiation safety act and nuclear liability acts aim to cover 
domestic accidents in many countries which have their own nuclear energy 
production. Transboundary accidents build up a somewhat different situation 
as regards compensation. The conventions (‘Paris Convention’ 1964/1982, 
‘Brussels Supplementary Convention, 1964/1982, ‘Vienna Convention, 1963 and 
‘Compensation Convention’ 1997) do not fulﬁ l completely compensation issues 
(OECD/NEA 2000). Many nuclear energy producing countries are not members 
of any these conventions. 
Compensation for damages will need political decisions in actual accident 
situations. In domestic accidents and in accidents in those countries which are 
parties to the relevant international conventions on third-party liability there is 
a legal framework for compensation. There are no other speciﬁ c regulations for 
compensation for damages caused by a nuclear accident. Compensation issues 
have led to many trials. Susskind and Field (1995) have proposed that ﬁ rst the 
responsibility has to be accepted, the legal process has to be fair and timely, 
and all unintended damages should be compensated for, not offering money in 
return for taking risks. 
Information technology played an important role in the last workshops 
(Amman et. al 2000, VII; Sinkko et. al 2004). It was a new feature of the workshop, 
i.e. that the participants could directly interact and experiment with their own 
decision models, and they encountered no noteworthy problems in doing so. Since 
Web-HIPRE is a Web-based application and can be accessed by the ubiquity of 
Web browsers, an easy-to-use user interface that required very little introduction 
was provided (Hämäläinen and Mustajoki 1998, Mustajoki, and Hämäläinen 
2000). The complete description of decision support tools for individual as well 
as for workshops or negotiation is given by Hämäläinen (2004, see also www.
decisionarium.hut.ﬁ ). With this software support, instant aggregations of group 
decision and a consensus model were easily obtained. A special web site was 
created for the two last workshops. A page comprising analogous facts to the 
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information package could be valuable in a real accident situation; updated 
results of the decision analysis could also be made available. Internet technology 
offers a fast and open channel to deliver information equitably and increase 
common knowledge of all key players. 
The technical equipment used during the workshop is easily installable at 
different locations. This facilitates the use of the system, for example in situations 
where key players’ mobility is restricted. This was demonstrated by the ease 
with which the equipment was transported and installed at the meeting location. 
Since the software is Internet-based, it enables remote participation and the use 
of external information, such as video material from the accident location. The 
equipment and state-of-the-art software support greatly eased the conducting of 
the workshop. It allowed the participants to concentrate on the issues at hand 
and not too much time was spent mastering unfamiliar technology. 
After the facilitated workshops reported here and in many workshops 
organised in seven European countries within EUs research project EVATECH 
the participants were asked to evaluate the workshop method (http://www3.
sckcen.be/samen/). Almost all participants considered the workshop method as 
very applicable in planning protective actions. This provides strong evidence 
that the workshop method ﬁ t for use. Although the method has been positively 
received by different types of key players more workshops should be organised 
to make the approach more known and more research are needed in planning 
of protective actions.
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EXPERIENCES IN METHODS TO INVOLVE KEY PLAYERS IN
PLANNING PROTECTIVE ACTIONS IN THE CASE OF A
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
K. Sinkko1,, R. P. HaÈmaÈlaÈinen2 and R. HaÈnninen1
1STUK±Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O. Box 14, Helsinki, Fin-00881, Finland
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A widely used method in the planning of protective actions is to establish a stakeholder network to generate a comprehensive
set of generic protective actions. The aim is to increase competence and build links for communication and coordination. The
approach of this work was to systematically evaluate protective action strategies in the case of a nuclear accident. This was
done in a way that the concerns and issues of all key players could be transparently and equally included in the decision taken.
An approach called Facilitated Decision Analysis Workshop has been developed and tested. The work builds on case studies in
which it was assumed that a hypothetical accident had led to a release of considerable amounts of radionuclides and, therefore,
various types of countermeasures had to be considered. Six workshops were organised in the Nordic countries where the key
players were represented, i.e. authorities, expert organisations, industry and agricultural producers.
INTRODUCTION
Openness, transparency and participation of the
key players are all important factors for balanced
decision-making in public issues. The research in key
players' involvement in environmental decisions has
led to the conclusion that if relevant parties are not
engaged in the decision-making process the policy
will fail and the ®nal decision `might please almost
no one and certainly infuriates many'(1,2). Key
players or stakeholders comprise responsible admin-
istrators and organisations, politicians as well as
representatives of affected citizens and other actors
who will and are likely to take part in decision-
making. International organisations in radiation
protection have recognised this importance of
prompt, open and transparent decision-making
based on scienti®c facts and social judgements(3).
They have stressed that the basis of the decision
must be perceived by the public and all relevant
factors concerning the decision should be considered
in a rational manner.
The consequences of an accident and the interven-
tion will depend substantially on the event, the
nuclide composition and on the season. The choice
of intervention measures is also linked to the legisla-
tion and the economy of the country potentially
affected. Because of this diversity, and constraints
and de®ciencies in the consequence calculation tools
in the past, the international organisations could not
have taken into account all potential scenarios and
all national circumstances. Recommended interven-
tion levels have been based on reasoning and generic
cost-bene®t optimisation of protective actions, which
most likely will protect the population in an appro-
priate way. Recommendations cover general and
readily available countermeasures. The detailed
planning has been left to national organisations
in each individual country worldwide. This study is
a response to the international call for national
planning of protective actions in advance.
There are different persons and organisations that
are responsible for the decision-making and for the
implementation of countermeasures at different
phases of an accident. At the accident site the opera-
tor or licensee for the practice, e.g. operation of a
nuclear power plant, is in general responsible for
controlling the event. The licensee may also be the
®rst organisation to take the initiative in implement-
ing off-site protective actions close to the site based
on emergency plans. In the longer term the decision-
making is subject to a country's administrative and
legal system where the key players will have an
important role and are making decisions on protective
actions.
Later phase protective actions, which usually con-
cern the society widely, are typically based on group
decisions. The key players may have different views
on the problem and the relevant objectives. The
players can be engaged in the decision-making pro-
cess in various ways: advisory committees, planning
cells, citizen juries, mediation etc.(1). The involve-
ment often increases the costs and complexity of
the process. Individual participation methods have
apparent advantages but some are also prone to
shortcomings in certain problems that have led
to criticisms(4,5). Many methods allow participants
to select the `easy' alternative. The decision might
not be accountable and long-term planning might be
neglected if the participants are not responsible for
implementation of the choice made. The workingCorresponding author: kari.sinkko@stuk.®
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procedures and the ef®ciency of the use of time in the
group meetings have also often been considered to
be poor(2,6). The reported experience emphasises the
importance of having clear procedures and methods
for the decision-making process. Not all participa-
tory methods articulate factors and judgements sys-
tematically and openly to be viewed by everyone
concerned.
The objective of this work in addition to planning
countermeasures in advance is to develop methods
to include concerns and issues of all key players
openly and equally in the decision. The approach
applied employs a group process where responsibility
is placed on the participants to assimilate informa-
tion and to provide judgements. It has a clear struc-
ture based on the decision analysis which provides a
reasoning and learning framework that intertwines
the beliefs, preferences and value judgements of the
participants and achieves a transparent ranking of
the strategies available. Decision analysis has a
major role in facilitated workshops. It guides discus-
sions and offers a structured way to tackle the pro-
blem. An important feature is also that it allows
participants to try different judgements to see the
consequences without a ®nal commitment. This
allows them to re-evaluate their opinions. The
essence of decision analysis is to break down a com-
plicated decision into small, manageable pieces that
can be dealt with individually and then recombined
logically. The main phases in this one-step-at-a-time
approach are: identi®cation of relevant objectives
and attributes, de®nition of action alternatives,
assessment of the consequences in each action,
judgement of the relative importance of conse-
quences and analysing how sensitive the resulting
ranking of actions is to changes in the values in
consequence assessment and trade-off judgements(7).
Decision analysis techniques have been applied to
solve societal problems such as environmental deci-
sions and energy policies(1,5,8,9). The papers by
Apostolakis and Pickett(10), HaÈmaÈlaÈinen(11±12),
Keeney and von Winterfelt(13) and Keeney(14) are
examples of studies of problems which also have
connections to nuclear emergency management. In the
®eld of nuclear emergency management, decision
analysis has been applied and facilitated workshops
have been organised in various countries(15±17).
International organisations have demonstrated how
justi®cation and optimisation could be applied to
planning protective actions(18). For example, the
IAEA aims to provide a benchmark against which
national plans can be compared. The planning is
based on a simple cost±bene®t analysis.
This paper reports and summarises observations
from different types of facilitated workshops. The
®rst workshops followed a two-day decision con-
ferencing approach. Other forms of decision confer-
ences have also been suggested, e.g., the spontaneous
decision conferencing concept, where the whole pro-
cess can be accomplished in just a few hours and
with minimal arrangements(6). In problems involving
experts and higher level policy makers time is always
limited. Therefore, this more concise type of
approach was seen to be practical. The shorter type
workshops necessitate extensive collection of back-
ground information and preceding preparatory
meetings but this kind of process was seen to comply
with conventional emergency management. Another
approach is to apply an interview technique in order
to analyse the decision from the perspective of
individual stakeholders. This approach was also
applied in this study.
FACILITATED WORKSHOPS AND
STAKEHOLDER NETWORKS
The aim of the stakeholder network method is to
collect information for decision-making and build
up a forum for regular communication between the
key players(19). The object of the facilitated work-
shops is to evaluate systematically the protective
action strategies in such a way that concerns and
issues of all key players could be considered openly
and taken into account equally in the decision. An
important outcome of the work is the creation of
preconditions for participatory decision-making in
case of a nuclear accident.
A series of facilitated workshops have been
organised in the Nordic countries to analyse protec-
tive actions and develop methods for key player
participation in case of a nuclear accident. The
workshops were jointly arranged by the Nordic
cooperation organisation (NKS, Nordic Nuclear
Safety Research) and the University of Leeds, in
Denmark in 1992 and in Sweden in 1995, by the
STUK±Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority and
the Helsinki University of Technology in Finland in
1997, 1998, 1999 and 2001. STUK was responsible for
the coordination, development of the accident sce-
narios, consequence assessments and for the contacts
with the key players. University of Leeds and Helsinki
University of Technology were responsible for the
decision modelling and analysis approaches, and for
the implementation of the decision support software
as well as for the facilitation of the workshops.
The NKS organised the ®rst two workshops held
in Denmark and Sweden(20,21). The members of these
workshops were local government of®cials, emer-
gency planners and members of the radiation protec-
tion community from all the Nordic countries. The
two subsequent workshops and decision analysis
interview were conducted within the fourth Frame-
work Programme of the EU(22,23). The last Finnish
workshop was funded by local sources(24).
The planning of protective actions and the partici-
patory method development is based on case studies
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where key players were invited to consider a scenario
of a hypothetical but realistic nuclear accident. It
was assumed that a core-damage and containment
leak accident had occurred at a nuclear power plant,
leading to the contamination of the environment. To
make the cases more realistic the accident sequence
was typically taken from probabilistic reactor safety
studies (PSA) performed by the NPP and STUK
safety experts. It was also considered important
that the current emergency management process of
the administration was followed closely and that all
the relevant players were represented at the meet-
ings. Experience gained from this work supports
the view that facilitated workshops ®t well in the
planning phase in a decision-making process where
the key players with expertise in different areas ana-
lyse and evaluate alternative options to be given for
®nal debate before the formal decision is taken
(Figure 1). Contacts were made and preparatory
meetings held prior to the workshops. This would
also take place in real emergencies.
Several protective actions and the bundle of
actions, i.e. strategies, were selected to be considered
in the workshops. The workshop held in Denmark
considered countermeasures in a situation where
early phase protective actions had been taken and
decisions on the later phase protective actions were
to be considered. The main issue was to consider
whether to relocate people in certain areas. The
theme in the second Nordic workshops was the deci-
sion of clean-up actions in inhabited areas. The ®rst
Finnish workshops focused on the early phase coun-
termeasures, i.e. administration of iodine tablets,
sheltering and evacuation. The value tree model
and de®nitions of attributes related to the decision
of early phase protective actions were studied in
depth. The different ways of incorporating uncer-
tainty into the emergency management was studied in
these workshops and in the interview study. The task
of the last workshop was to plan countermeasures to
reduce the dose received from consumption of dairy
products contaminated by radionuclides. The alter-
native actions were: no action, provision of uncon-
taminated fodder, milk processing to cheese or
butter and banning (cf. Figure 2).
The simulation of the radiological situation and
the generation of countermeasure strategies,
together with the assessment of their consequences,
were done in advance. The participants were given
information comprising thematic maps of the radio-
logical situation showing an animation of the
dispersion, dose values and assessments of health
and economic consequences. This information was
also provided in the form of consequence tables. The
possible precautionary actions taken to protect the
population were mentioned. A list of prede®ned
attributes, the parties involved in decision-making
and their duties were attached. All in all, the package
was designed to contain all the relevant informa-
tion necessary for the participants to understand
the accident situation and to be able to make an
informed decision on the countermeasures.
At the beginning of the workshops the list of
attributes and the value tree were presented and
introduced for discussion (Figure 2). The participants
Key players/ stakeholders 
Facilitated workshop for 
overall optimisation
Decision makers
Formal decision
Advice, open debate, 
set up opinions 
Experts 
Preparatory meetings
Expert organisations
Collection of information on health, social, 
psychology, environment, economy etc.
Figure 1. A schematic view of an ideal type decision-
making process applicable in the planning of protective
actions.
Overall 
Goal
Health
Society 
Thyroid cancers
Other cancers 
Reassurance 
Anxiety 
Social disrupt. 
Feasibility
Costs 
Figure 2. Value (or attribute) tree used in the workshop,
which considered countermeasures to reduce the dose
received from consumption of dairy products
contaminated by radionuclides.
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were urged to go through, revise, remove, add and
re-de®ne any attribute they wished. Eventually, the
group agreed on the ®nal set of attributes. The `hard'
attributes, i.e. number of cancer cases and costs were
calculated in advance but the `soft' attributes like
social disruption and anxiety were directly rated
during the workshops. A decision model was con-
structed and value or utility analyses were performed
including sensitivity analysis with commercially
available software. The results were discussed at the
end of the workshops.
DISCUSSION
The workshops aimed to elicit protective actions or
strategies of which the scale, timing and duration
were optimised in the given situation (optimisation
in the sense of radiation protection). Decision ana-
lysis techniques can be used to evaluate and identify
the best strategy, i.e. to rank strategies. The justi®ca-
tion of countermeasures embodies many value
judgements and is implicitly included in the analysis.
If all possible alternatives are considered, the best
ranked option should also be justi®ed. In the tradi-
tional vocabulary of radiation protection the optimal
choice is thus found.
There should be a clear understanding of the
countermeasures and factors affecting the decisions.
The timing, duration and target area of the actions,
and the group aimed to be protected by the actions
could be quite easily assessed and should be clearly
de®ned. The objectives and attributes are not
self-evident. In the workshops, a lot of time was
spent on de®ning the factors and the wording used
in the value elicitation. Especially, intangible attri-
butes such as anxiety and reassurance can easily be
interpreted differently. It seems to be bene®cial to
de®ne the attributes in advance in order to save time
and to guarantee that all key players will understand
their meaning in the same way. The de®nition of
attributes in advance is contrary to the standard
way of using decision analysis and possibly leads to
such biases as availability or anchoring. However,
nuclear accidents are rare and the key players are not
very familiar with the radiological issues or the
related terminology. It was found that in order to
harmonise the discussion it is practical and ef®cient
to start with a pre-de®ned, preliminary value tree
model of attributes. The participants were asked to
®ll in a questionnaire after the workshops in order to
®nd out their opinions on the decision analysis and
the workshop method. The questionnaire con®rmed
that the participants were rather satis®ed with the
pre-de®ned attributes and ensured that all relevant
factors were included in the model.
Open and transparent societal decisions are
desired both by the public and politicians(5). One
®nding of the study is that transparency and
communication could be clearly increased by apply-
ing the structured approach of decision analysis. The
decision-making process was made fairer and more
competent by involving key players. Susskind and
Field(2) have argued that face-to-face negotiations
among the key players could be the only way to settle
the acceptable level of risk. However, the active
participation of all the key players increases the
cost and complexity of the process, and the decision
where to stop an analysis has to be made by seeking
a balance between elaborateness, time and the
resources available. There is no need for an analyti-
cal, participatory approach in recurrent decisions.
People are accustomed to routine decisions where
experience is available. However, rare, complex pro-
blems such as large protective actions can bene®t
from the use of facilitated workshops based on deci-
sion analysis.
It is important to learn to see where in the
decision-making process decision support in the form
of a workshop would be appropriate. Facilitated
workshops do not ®t comfortably in the decision-
making process applied commonly nowadays as a
forum for making ®nal decisions(21). Preparation of
a decision is divided into so many phases carried out
by many responsible people that a single decision-
making point cannot often be identi®ed. In a work-
shop a single decision-making point is pre-supposed.
Usually, politicians and authorities do not partici-
pate in the consequence assessment or in the pre-
paration or evaluation of a decision. They tend to
wait, avoid the commitment to the outcome and
distance themselves from it if necessary(1). They
expect prepared advice from the experts(10,25).
Experience gained from this work supports the
view that facilitated workshops ®t well in the plan-
ning phase in a decision-making process where the
key players with expertise in different areas evaluate
the alternative policy options in an open discourse
before the ®nal, formal decision-making.
It was found to be important that the relevant
expert organisations carry out the technical calcula-
tions and reports in such a way that the politicians
and authorities can understand the problem and the
consequences of the decision options. The informa-
tion collected should be in a suitable form for decision-
making as is described in the decision analysis. This
helps communication and saves time. The aggrega-
tion of unstructured information could easily result
in a collection of views which cannot be utilised in
the decision-making process. Experts are tempted to
do research and publish the results in a form that is
more suited to scienti®c reporting rather than
adapted to decision-making. They may resist provid-
ing any results at all until they are de®nitive enough
to withstand peer scrutiny. However, experience sug-
gests that with insuf®cient information a facilitated
workshop conducted early on will guide and focus
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the subsequent radiological research, model develop-
ment and collection of data. Technical meetings can
shed light on the information needed in decision-
making. However, the ®nal weight on the impor-
tance of information could be obtained after the
trade-offs have been made. It indicates the topics
that are the most important in decision-making and
shows where the allocation of resources into research
would be most bene®cial. Every workshop has made
proposals for the necessary research topics and data
collection.
Most participants were not familiar with this type
of structured approach of decision analysis and opi-
nions were divided about it. Some found that the
bene®ts were obvious but some did not feel comfor-
table with the modelling tools and had problems in
understanding the procedures, such as weighting of
attribute scales and incorporation of uncertainties
(utility analysis), in the decision-making process.
The de®nition of the attributes and the countermea-
sures, and decision table were easily adopted. One
reason why some were reluctant to take part in
decision analysis might be that they were expecting
a recurrent decision-making process where experi-
ence is available. The method had seldom been
applied in radiation protection and before the work-
shops there was no training for participants. Only
a few hours were spent on the issues and, con-
sequently, there was not enough time to explain in
detail all the decision analytical methods used during
the workshops. In the future new applications of
the approach to appropriate problems are likely to
increase acceptance and understanding of the
techniques.
CONCLUSIONS
Decision analysis offers a suitable framework to
aggregate values, beliefs and preferences that are
held by the different interest groups. In the case stu-
dies, it helped the participants tackle the decision-
making problem in a logical and ef®cient manner.
For example, when constructing the attribute tree
from objectives, the key players were encouraged to
think of all the factors that are important to them in
this context. An important achievement of the
induced discussion was that many de®nitions were
clari®ed and others revised. Probably the most impor-
tant bene®t was that the process created a shared
understanding of the decision problem. At a later
stage, the participants were asked to consider expli-
citly the necessary trade-offs between the attributes.
The given preference statements revealed the per-
ceived relative importance of each attribute. Thus,
the analysis did not merely yield a ranking of
the strategies investigated but it also revealed the
underlying reasoning behind it. The primary bene®t
of a decision analysis is the consequent improved
understanding and communication. This is impor-
tant because decisions taken need to be explained
and justi®ed afterwards. In addition, it increased the
level of commitment that is needed from all interest
groups to carry out interventions agreed upon.
The experience gained strongly supports the use of
the facilitated workshop method to tackle a decision
problem that concerns many different key players. In
the study, the participants considered the workshops
and the decision analyses to be very useful in the
planning of the relevant actions in advance. They
also expected a similar approach to be applicable in
a real accident situation, although the suitability was
not rated as high as for planning. The suitability of
the method for the early phase of an accident was
rated the lowest.
The pros and cons of the facilitated workshop
method can be compared with the conventional
approaches. The general goal is that key players
would be better prepared for an accident situation.
All participatory methods also create a network of
key players. Facilitated workshops provide the par-
ticipants with an open forum for discussing openly
the values behind the decision. The stakeholder net-
work can evaluate and augment generic countermea-
sures but all the possible and feasible protective
actions cannot be justi®ed and optimised in depth.
The ranking of protective actions depends on
trade-offs and is thus dependent on the problem at
hand.
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A nuclear accident itself and the introduction of protective action entail risks to the people 
affected, monetary costs and social disruption. As far as the society is concerned the values 
which enter decisions on protective actions are multidimensional. People have strong feelings 
and beliefs about these values, some of which are not numerically quantifiable and do not 
exist in monetary form. These problems, often including mutually conflicting objectives and 
uncertainties and are difficult to control simultaneously, cannot be undertaken without careful 
consideration of the essential consequences of decisions. Decision analysis can be applied in 
planning intervention, this helps in rendering explicit and apparent all the factors involved 
and evaluating their relative importance. In this study recovery operations to clean up a forest 
environment in the event of a hypothetical radiation accident in a nuclear power plant were 
analyzed and discussed to determine what would be appropriate intervention levels in 
protecting the public, workers and the environment. The values considered essential in the 
decision were included in the analysis and their importance on decision making process is 
discussed. 
 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Situations in which the radiation sources, the pathways and the exposed individuals are 
already in place when decisions on remedial actions are considered, are called intervention 
situations. In these situations the doses which are received or are likely to be received can 
only be reduced by remedial actions. The basic principle when implementing of protective 
actions is that intervention should be justified and optimized, i.e., the introduction of a 
protective measure should achieve more good than harm and the net benefit should be 
maximized (IAEA91, ICRP91). Decision analysis is a suitable method for helping to solve 
societal problems of this type. 
 
Research over the past 30 years has transformed the abstract mathematical discipline of 
decision theory to a potentially useful technology known as decision analysis, which can 
assist decision makers to handle large and complex problems together with their attendant 
flow of information. Decision analysis is not intended to solve problems directly. It’s purpose 
is to produce insight and understanding. In the light of that understanding the decision maker 
can make better decisions. Those interested in the theory of decision analysis may consult the 
 
 
literature (Fr88, Go92, Ke76, Wi86). This report provides an application how decision 
analysis can be used when planning protective actions. 
 
As initially presented the background information is generally limited or incomplete in 
decision making. A careful analysis of the problem indicates what further information is 
needed to find the best course of action. Thus the aim of this study was not only to find the 
best protective actions, but also to indicate the information that should be catered for or 
revised. If in the light of revised information or gained insight new, feasible actions are 
identified, the analysis should be revised. 
 
The following analysis deals with protective actions for contaminated forest areas. The 
actions which most probably have to be taken on cultivated or natural foodstuffs, were 
excluded, although they might have had an effect on the analysis. Because of the high 
contamination levels considered in this study there would certainly be restrictions on the use 
of natural foodstuffs. 
 
 
8.2. ACCIDENT SCENARIO 
 
For the purpose of the analysis it was assumed that a hypothetical accident had happened at a 
nuclear power plant in Finland leading to a core melt and to a very severe - presumably worst 
possible - contamination of the environment (cf. chapter 3). 10% of fission products and 1% 
the transuranics were assumed to have released from a 700 MW BWR reactor. It was further 
assumed that the accident had happened in summer time and there had been only dry 
deposition. As a consequence of the accident the forest areas given in Table I were 
contaminated. 
 
 
Table I. Fallout area in forest land and the contamination levels after a hypothetical reactor 
accident.  
 
Nuclide Area I 
1.5  km2 
Area II 
22 km2 
Area III 
1660 km2 
137Cs  
mean 
> 100 MBq/m2 10-100 MBq/m2  
20  MBq/m2 
1-10  MBq/m2 
2  MBq/m2 
90Sr 
mean 
> 77  MBq/m2 7.7-77  MBq/m2 
15  MBq/m2 
0.8-7.7  MBq/m2 
1.5  MBq/m2 
239Pu 
mean 
> 22  kBq/m2 2.2-22  kBq/m2 
5  kBq/m2 
0.2-2.2 kBq/m2 
0.5  kBq/m2 
 
 
 
8.3. CONCERNS AND ISSUES 
 
From the radiation protection point of view the aim of protective actions is to reduce the 
individual as well as the collective doses to the public and workers, and also to reduce 
radiological impacts on the environment. Concerning the forest, the aim is also to keep the 
area in, or bring it back into production by feasible decontamination. 
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Intervention will affect the exposure pathways, and it should be carefully considered, that the 
total detriment of the population is reduced and, e.g., the dose is not reduced in one group by 
increasing it in another group. For example, the decontamination and the reduction of 
exposure to the population can be achieved only by increasing the doses to workers, who are 
carrying out the intervention measures. 
 
The use of dose limits as the basis for the deciding on intervention might involve actions that 
would be out of all proportion to the benefit obtained and would thus conflict with the 
principles of justification and optimization. ICRP therefore recommends against the 
application of dose limits or any predetermined limits for deciding on the need for 
intervention. However, the position of workers carrying out recovery operations is different. 
These actions, non the less even they are in response to an accident, can be planned and 
optimized in advance and therefore it is recommended that workers undertaking recovery 
operations should be subject to the normal system of radiological protection and dose limits 
should be applied. 
 
The intervention measures entail also non-radiological risks to the population and the workers 
caused by various kind of accidents. The risks which are directly associated with remedial 
actions should be taken into account when making decisions on intervention. In addition, 
there might be radiological risks caused, for example, by forest fires. Fires would result in the 
resuspension of radionuclides and an increasing number of individuals will be subject to 
radiation. 
 
Psychological stress could lead to health effects of a comparable nature to those arising from 
the contamination and at the same time reduces the quality of life significantly. A majority of 
the population in a contaminated area may show varying degrees of stress reactions, but stress 
could also be a consequence of a protective action. Stress can be reduced by taking 
appropriate actions, such as actions which decrease the dose of population, but at the same 
time this would lead to an increase in exposure among the intervening workers. 
 
Perceived risk, in addition of health effects, can have serious economical and social 
consequences, e.g., to the forest economy and industry. The public opinion and the perception 
of risk could result in consequences which reduce the benefit of actions or make their 
implementation impossible. For example, in a limited accident the population (and the forest 
industry) might not accept products made from wood grown in the contaminated area 
although, e.g., only bark and branches of the trees were contaminated and the contamination 
could be removed very efficiently. The industry might think that the risk of being discredited 
by using contaminated materials is too great, and thus refuse to use even slightly 
contaminated raw materials. 
 
Individual people and families own 75% of forests in Finland and the average area of a forest 
estate is 0.35 km2. Thus, there would be nearly 5000 private forest estates in the contaminated 
area considered in this study. Land owners would be worried about their property and 
incomes, and so there would be considerable stress within this group of people. 
 
The fallout would reduce the value of contaminated land for decades, but it would also reduce 
the value and the quality of the surrounding areas. The reduction in quality of the 
environment would take place also in the vicinity of disposal sites and around power stations 
burning radioactive wood. 
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Remedial actions would cause monetary costs to the individual land owners, industry and the 
society. The costs would include transportation costs, loss of income, costs of the control of 
the area and costs of lost capital services. Also the question of reimbursing land owners for 
any remedial actions would arise. If any compensation is paid, either in full or in part, it 
means that the costs to individuals would now be costs to society. None the less, would the 
cost of action be a limiting factor? The economic impact of an accident may not be entirely 
negative. The activities may have positive effect on the economy, such as generation of 
employment or production of energy by burning wood produced in the contaminated area. 
 
 
8.4. DECISION MODEL 
 
8.4.1. Action alternatives 
 
The essence of decision analysis is to break down complicated decisions into small 
components that can be dealt with individually and then recombined logically. The process of 
breaking something down into its constituent parts refers to the process of developing an 
overall analytic structure. The formulation of the problem is to identify what can be done and 
what might happen as a consequence. In this process construction of a decision table or a 
decision tree is a very helpful method. Figure 1 shows a decision tree used to analyze the 
remediation strategies of contaminated forests. Decision tree compactly represents a set of 
scenarios. Any path from left to right through the tree constitutes a scenario. We will discuss 
in more detail these scenarios when discussing the strategies which can considered for 
cleaning up the contaminated forest. 
 
One main stage in the decision analysis is to identify the alternative courses of action. In 
considering an intervention, all feasible actions should be defined - including no action. When 
defining an action, its feasibility should also be considered; could it be implemented in 
practice as it has been planned? For instance, it should be taken into account that society is 
not neutral to the choice of action. The remedial actions which were considered in this study 
are no action, control of wood material, control of access and removal of various parts of 
vegetation, i.e., trees, stumps, udervegetation and/or soil. 
 
If in any of the defined areas (I, II or III in this analysis) no recovery operation, control of 
wood material or control of access is taken, the contamination is left in full in the forest. The 
amounts of radioactive materials will decrease with time through radioactive decay and by 
resuspension, which will cause transfer of radionuclides also to habilitated areas exposing 
unidentified people (projected release scenarios). The resuspension over 70 years is estimated 
to be 15%. Also, if the use of contaminated wood material is not restricted, its use will cause 
transfer of radionuclides to living environment. It is estimated, that the total amount of 
transfer in this pathway will be 30% over 70 years. 
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No action 
Forest fire 
No Action 
Intervene
Projected release 
scenarios
Forest fire 
Projected release 
scenarios
Projected release 
scenarios
Forest fire 
Removal of trees 
Trees and 
vegetation
Trees, vegetation 
 and soil 
Contol of wood 
material 
Control of 
access
Remedial  
actions 
No Action
Intervene 
No Action 
Intervene
No Action 
Intervene 
No Action 
Intervene
No Action 
Intervene
For industrial use 
Disposal 
Burn and disposal 
For industrial use 
Disposal 
Burn and disposal 
For industrial use 
Disposal 
Burn and disposal 
Figure 1.  Decision tree to analyze the cleanup strategies of contaminated forest. 
 
 
A forest fire will cause a spread of radionuclides. According to the statistics there are a few 
hundred forest fires in Finland every year in which 0.05 km2 of forest is burnt on average. The 
probability, that a forest fire would occur in the contaminated area is less than 0.01 in a year. 
By assuming that 50% of radionuclides being in forest will be released in a fire, gives the 
result that the expected collective dose to the public would be very low (few ten's of 
mmanSv) as compared to the other pathways. Thus a forest fire is not an important scenario 
when considering the actions to be taken. 
 
Decontamination of forest could be done by removing trees, stumps, undervegetation and/or 
soil. If all these are removed after two years it is estimated that 20% of radionuclides will 
remain in the contaminated area. When only trees and undervegetation are removed after two 
years the cleanup efficiency is estimated to be 60% in practice. During the first season the 
radionuclides are mostly in canopies, and by removing the trees the practical efficiency of 
decontamination is estimated to be 50%. 
 
Based on the information mentioned above six strategies as defined in Table II were 
considered. 
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Table II. Strategies for recovery operations in forest areas defined in terms of their effects on 
the areas I, II and III. 
 
Strategy Removal 
of trees a 
Removal 
of trees 
and 
underveg
etation b 
Removal 
of trees, 
underveg
etation 
and soil b 
Control 
of access 
c 
Control 
of wood 
material 
  No 
action 
1 II  I I, II  III 
2 II I  I, II  III 
3  I, II  I, II  III 
4    I, II  III 
5    I, II, III   
6   I I, II III  
 
a) Action is taken during the same season. 
b) Action is taken two years after the fallout. 
c) Projected period for control of access is 70 years. 
 
 
Actually many more strategies could be considered by combining the areas and possible 
decontamination strategies. The limiting the analysis to those above would, however, not 
reduce the possibilities for evaluating the best course of action. Some strategies are not even 
feasible, e.g., it is not possible to remove the trees in area I during the same season, because 
the individual doses would be unacceptable high; the dose rate would be one mSv/h. 
Furthermore, as is indicated in the decision tree, there are three different methods to treat 
contaminated and removed trees: 
 
1. Industrial use of trunks in sawmills or in pulp industry. Disposal of branches and 
barks as such or as ash after burning as fuel. 
2. Chipping the trees, branches and stumps and burning the chip in power stations. 
Disposal of the remaining ash. 
3. Disposal of trees as they are or in the chipped form. 
 
These optional methods will be discussed below in more detail. 
 
1. Industrial use. The method can not be easily applied. In principle, if trees are barked in the 
same or in the following season, the wood itself will be clean and the activity will be mostly 
still in the bark and in the branches. However, only big trees are barked in sawmills 
nowadays. There is a lack of machines suitable for this action to be done in the forest. Also, 
the distribution of contamination during the barking process would be unacceptable high. 
 
If the trees are used in the chemical pulp industry, the pulp will be clean because during the 
process the radionuclides will be removed and they remain in the waste sludge. The 
contamination of machines would be a problem. 
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The most serious problem is the public opinion. Although it could be shown that the products 
made of contaminated material would be free from radioactivity, the industry and the 
population would in all probability not accept them. Public can be very suspicious about this 
kind of products as was demonstrated after the Chernobyl accident. Also, clean wood material 
would be available. Thus, the industrial use of contaminated trunks have to be rejected as a 
strategy. 
 
2. Burning of wood before disposal. There are small (5 MW) and large (20 - 200 MW) power 
stations in every Nordic country, which are suitable for burning chipped wood material. If 
proper electrostatic precipitators are used, 95-99% of radionuclides will remain in the ash. 
The amount of waste ash to be disposed would be small. An ash contents of 5% have been 
used in the calculation. However, there will be some suspicion of burning radioactive 
material, especially among the population in the vicinity of the power stations. 
 
3. Disposal of all material as such. Undervegetation, litter, humus and soil have to be 
disposed as such. Wood material can also be disposed as it is, but chipping the trees, branches 
and stumps, however, will help in the disposal and rotting of material. In all cases, final 
disposal cannot be undertaken before the organic material is rotten. 
 
Burning of wood before disposal and disposal of all material as such are the two optional 
methods considered in the analysis. 
 
 
8.4.2. Objectives and attributes 
 
Having  found the courses of action, the next main step is to identify all attributes (measures 
in figure 2) relevant to the decision. One technique to identify an operational set of attributes, 
is to start by listing all important objectives (goals in figure 2), such as minimizing health 
detriment, monetary cost and social disruption. In order to check the list, the objectives can be 
divided into general categories: health, safety, social, political, psychological and economical 
effects. Many of these objectives will necessarily be part of the decision making process 
following radiological emergencies. Some of the objectives might be directly measured on a 
numerical scale and some should be further divided into sub-objectives in order to be 
measurable. This kind of numeric variable is called an attribute. An attribute is used to 
measure the performance of actions in relation to an objective. Natural attributes are, e.g., 
immediate deaths, cancer cases or reduction of the lifespan. An attribute hierarchy (value 
tree) can be useful in defining attributes and objectives. Figure 2 shows the value tree for the 
remedial operations for the problem in hand.  
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COSTS
Measure
ECNOM. BENEFIT
Measure
ECONOMY
Goal
COLLET DOSE
Measure
WORKERS DOSE
Measure
RADIAT RELATED
Goal
STRESS
Measure
HEALTH
Goal
No. OF WORKERS
Measure
CLENLINESS
Measure
USE OF ENVIRON
Measure
QUALITY OF ENVIR
Goal
OVERALL
Goal
 
 
Figure 2. Hierarchy of attributes used in the decision model. 
 
 
The attributes used in the analysis are defined as follows. 
 
The effect on health is seen to have two components, of which radiation related health effects 
is further divided into two sub-attributes: these are doses to the workers and dose to the 
public. 
 
Dose to the public. Because exposed individuals are not identifiable, the value of this attribute 
is assessed as the projected collective dose to the public (manSv). This relates to the expected 
number of fatal cancers caused by radiation, calculated by applying a risk factor of 5% to the 
dose in manSv. 
 
Doses to the workers. Projected individual doses to the workers carrying out the recovery 
operations (mSv). 
 
Number of workers carrying out the recovery operations. As initially planned the recovery 
operations will cause unacceptable high individual doses to the workers (several ten's of 
mSv). To keep the doses acceptable, i.e., below the dose limits, more workers should be 
employed. Thus, an objective will be to keep the number of workers as low as possible. 
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Stress. Psychological stress caused by radiation both to the public and workers. Stress will be 
decreased or increased by protective actions and it reduces the quality of life. This attribute 
aims to capture also the stress caused by unemployment of workers in the affected area and 
worry felt by land owners. 
 
Quality of the environment. This attribute is seen to have two sub-attributes; Cleanliness of 
the environments and the use of the environment for refreshment. These attributes are aimed 
to capture the reduction in the quality of the contaminated areas and the living areas close to 
the contaminated forest, disposal site and around power stations burning radioactive wood. 
 
Economic benefit. The monetary benefit to the industry and the society obtained by burning 
the wood as fuel (MFIM). 
 
Costs. The monetary costs caused by implementing recovery operations. Total costs include 
direct costs of operations (harvesting, transportation, disposal), control of the area, loss of 
income and lost capital services (MFIM). 
 
 
8.4.3. How the strategies perform on each attribute 
 
Now the consequences of the actions can be assessed, i.e., how well the different actions 
perform for each of the lowest level attributes in the value tree. The consequences are the 
values of attributes in various actions, e.g., the assessed dose if action is taken and the action's 
monetary costs. The measurement of these two attributes is easy, because we can identify the 
variables representing them. However, for attributes, such as stress and quality of 
environment, it is more difficult to find a proxy attributes or variables that can be quantified. 
The techniques, which can be used to express the preferences over the values of an attribute, 
are direct rating and the use of value functions. 
 
Direct rating can be used with attributes which cannot be represented by easily quantifiable 
variables. In this technique, the most preferred option for, e.g., stress, a value of 100 is given 
and the value of zero for the least preferred option. The other options are ranked between zero 
and 100, according to the strength of preference for one option over another in terms of stress. 
Although this technique seems to be robust it should be emphasized that there are methods to 
check the consistency of the elicited numbers. Also, numbers do not need to be precise. As 
will be pointed out later when discussing sensitivity analysis, the choice of an action is 
generally fairly robust, and often substantial changes in the figures are required before 
another option is preferred.  
 
The preferences over values of an attribute can be changed numerical also by a value 
function. As in direct rating the most preferred option for an attribute, a value of 100 (or 1.0), 
is given, and the value of zero for the least preferred option. There are several methods which 
can be used to elicit the intermediate values to form a continuous value function. The simplest 
conversion, which is used in this analysis, is a straight line, where a unit change in the 
preference of an attribute corresponds to an equal change in value. 
 
The assessed values of attributes for each action are given in Table III. 
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Table III. Values of the attributes for strategies defined in Table II.  
 
Strategy Collective 
dose to 
public 
(manSv) 
Individual 
dose to 
workers 
(mSv) 
Number of 
workers 
Economica
l benefit 
(MFIM) 
Costs of 
action 
(MFIM) 
1a 5460 20 1270 120 121 
1b 5380 20 1220 0 129 
2a 5480 20 1230 120 119 
2b 5400 20 1180 0 127 
3a 5390 20 3550 166 151 
3b 5370 20 3570 0 163 
4 5560 0 0 0 66 
5 2050 0 0 0 4710 
6b 3140 20 170 0 3200 
 
a) Wood material is burned as fuel before disposal 
b) All material is disposed as such. 
 
 
In assessing the collective dose to the public the external dose and intake of radionuclides in 
all relevant pathways were considered, i.e., the dose caused by resuspension, burning 
radioactive wood, using contaminated wood material and forest fire. Of these the use of 
contaminated wood would cause the highest doses, 3500 manSv. The inhalation dose over 70 
years was considered to be small compared to intake and external dose. There are no models 
designed specifically for this kind of problem. Therefore, the dose calculations have to be 
based on expert judgments and as far as possible on the dispersion and dose prediction models 
developed primarily for accidents at nuclear power plant. The dose predictions were done by 
ARANO software package (Sa77). 
 
The dose to each worker group in each work phase were calculated separately; felling the 
trees, removal of undervegetation and soil, transportation of trunks, chip and ash, and disposal 
of wood material or ash. The software package MATERIA was used to assess the individual 
doses to workers (Ma93). In most cases the estimated doses were unacceptable high, several 
ten's of mSv, and in these cases the number of workers was increased to keep the individual 
doses below 20 mSv. 
 
The use of wood will strongly be affected by public opinion if the action to control of wood 
material would is taken (strategy 6b). Because the contaminated area would be commonly 
known, all the wood material from these areas would not be accepted by the industry. This 
will cause a reduction in collective dose, but at the same time will increase the monetary 
losses to land owners. It was estimated, that one third of wood otherwise used, i.e., if no 
action is taken, will be rejected. 
 
 
 
The monetary costs of actions and also benefits were calculated using the information 
collected in other study of this project (cf. chapter 6), Finnish statistics and similar monetary 
costs assessment methods as is presented in COCO-1 report (Ha91). The costs of lost capital 
service and removal of trees are the main costs components. 
 
The scales for stress and quality of the environment attributes were developed judgmentally 
and the values are given below in Tables IV and V. Higher score represents a more preferred 
actions. 
 
 
Table IV. Scores of stress attribute. 
 
Strategy 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4 5 6b 
Score 80 90 90 100 60 70 40 0 50 
 
a) Wood material is burned as fuel before disposal 
b) All material is disposed as such. 
 
 
Strategy 2b was given the highest score because it treats the workers, the population and land 
owners fairly, offering a certain degree of decontamination and because the wood would not 
be burned there would be no local fallout. Also, the amount of disposed waste would be 
acceptable. It was felt that to reduce psychological effects it is important to take the actions 
shortly after the accident and at the same time to avoid too excessive actions. Strategy 5 was 
given the lowest score. It treats area III differently than others by offering reassurance only by 
controlling the access to the area, but on the other hand, it would cause lot of problems to 
individual land owners even if the cost of action would have to be borne by the society. 
Strategy 4 was seen as next least acceptable. It offers no reassurance of decontamination, 
although there would be no doses to the workers. The scores for other strategies were 
assessed according their strength of preferences using similar arguments. 
 
 
Table V. Scores of quality of the environment attribute.  
 
Strategy 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4 5 6b 
Score 100 90 80 70 90 80 20 0 50 
 
a) Wood material is burned as fuel before disposal 
b) All material is disposed as such. 
 
 
Although there are sub-attributes, the cleanliness and the use of environment, below the 
quality of environment attribute it was thought to be appropriate to assess the scores directly 
to the higher level attribute, i.e., to the quality. Strategies 4 and 5 were given the worst scores 
because the contamination would be left untouched in the environment. The objective, the use 
of the environment was also in its worst position in strategy 5. The control of access (with 
fences) would also impair the quality of the environment. Although there would be a small 
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release of radionuclides into the environment in strategy 1a when burning contaminated 
wood, it was felt that this strategy offers the best quality of the environment. The other 
strategies were felt to be less attractive and the assessed scores are seen in the Table V.  
 
In the analysis the figures given above, e.g., collective doses, were transformed linearly to 0 - 
1 scales and their different relative lengths are taken into account in assessing the weights on 
attributes (see below). 
 
 
8.4.4 Trade-offs 
 
Before we can combine the values for different attributes in order to obtain a view of overall 
benefits which each action has to offer, we have to assess the weights on attributes. They 
represent the judgment of the decision maker on the relative importance of the levels of 
attributes. For example, how much he/she is ready to accept doses to individual workers to 
avoid a certain dose to the population. When assessing a trade-off value, it should be noticed 
that the importance of an attribute is not only dependent on its conceptual value, such as 
health, but also on its range of values, such as the number of cancer cases. The range means 
the difference in values in various actions, e.g., the difference in dose when the action is taken 
or not taken. 
 
Swing weighting is applied in the analysis as an assessment method for scaling constants, i.e., 
the trade-offs. In the method a decision maker is asked to compare a set of pairs of hypothe-
tical actions which differ only in their values along two attribute scales until an indifferent 
pair of options is found. For example: 
 
Option A: The individual dose is 20 mSv and the collective dose is 0 mmanSv. 
Option B: The individual dose is 0 mSv and the collective dose is 100 mmanSv. 
 
If the options A and B are felt to be indifferent, it can be seen that it is more preferred to 
avoid higher individual risks than individually low but collectively higher risk. It is estimated, 
that the individual doses to the population are far less than one mSv on average. If we set the 
weight of the collective dose to one, and taking into account the 'length' of collective dose 
scale, 3510 manSv, and individual dose scale, 20 mSv, this suggests a weight 
(5*0.001*20/3510) = 0.00003 for the individual dose scale relative to the collective dose 
scale. 
 
The weights were set on other attributes using similar judgments. For example, the following 
indifferent (marked with ~) pair of options was elicited for the number of workers and 
individual dose: 
 
 (1 men; 20 mSv) ~ (100 men; 1 mSv). 
 
This assessment together with the fact that the number of workers scale has a length of 3570 
men and the worker dose scale 20 mSv, means that number of workers scale is felt 36 times 
as important as the individual worker dose scale of 20 mSv. Altogether six trade-offs have to 
be assessed in order to have a complete set of weights. The following pairs of attributes were 
used to assess the weights, and the indifferent options are given below: 
 
Collective dose/costs attributes: 
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 (2 manSv; 0 MFIM)  ~ (1 manSv; 0.25 MFIM) 
 
Costs of action/monetary benefit attributes: 
 (0 MFIM; 170 MFIM) ~ (170 MFIM; 0 MFIM) 
 
Collective dose/stress attributes: 
 (3000 manSv; 100 Stress )  ~ (2000 manSv; 0 Stress ) 
 
Stress/quality attributes: 
 (50 Stress; 100 Quality) ~ (100 Stress; 0 Quality ). 
 
Based on these assessments the following weights are obtained (Table VI). Note: The weights 
are normalized so that the sum of weights is one. 
 
 
Table VI. Weights of attributes. 
 
Attribute  Weight 
Collective dose 0.15 
Individual dose of workers 0.000004 
Number of workers 0.0002 
Monetary costs of action 0.76 
Economic benefit 0.03 
Stress 0.04 
Quality of the environment 0.02 
 
 
 
8.5. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
 
At this stage we are in position to aggregate the values to find out how well each strategy 
performs overall. The Additive model was applied simply to add together an action's weighted 
value scores (weighted attribute values on each action) to obtain the overall benefit: 
 
 v(a) = ∑i kivi(ai), 
 
where vi(ai) are single-attribute value functions, ai are assessed values of attributes and ki are 
weighting factors. Note: A sufficient condition for an additive decomposition of multi-
attribute value function is mutual preferential independence of the attributes. An attribute X is 
preferentially independent of attribute Y, if the two preference values of attribute X do not 
depend on the value of Y. The existence of preferential independence is normally verified 
during the analysis - and should, in principle, be verified. If the conditions for an additive 
function exist, the weights are assessed by making trade-offs between attributes as described 
earlier. 
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To make the calculations slightly easier the decision model was build using the software 
package LDW (Sm93). The overall scores and ranking of strategies are as is given in table 
VII. Strategy 1a, decontamination in areas I and II, and no restriction in area III, is just 
optimal. In fact, strategies 1-4 rank very close to each other. This is due to area III, which 
because its large area has a strong effect on attribute values. In strategies 1-4 the same action 
is taken in the area III. 
 
 
Table VII. Overall scores for the initial analysis. 
 
Strategy  1a 1b  2a 2b  3a  3b 4  5 6b 
Overall score 0.834 0.819 0.833 0.819 0.829 0.805 0.790 0.195 0.41 
Rank 1st  4th 2nd  4th 3rd 5th 6th 8th 7th 
 
 
It is wise to be skeptical about the ranking of the actions, if the variation of figures used in the 
analysis is not analyzed with a sensitivity analysis. We have to examine how robust the 
choice of an alternative is to changes in the figures. In many cases sensitivity analysis also 
shows that the data do not need to be accurate. Large changes in these figures are often 
required before one action becomes more attractive than another. If this is the case, then it 
would be waste of effort and time to elicit the numbers accurately. 
 
There are several techniques presented in the literature to perform a sensitivity analysis. The 
most straightforward analysis applied here examines the effects of varying one parameter at a 
time. Although the method is simple it clearly indicates which factors are important and 
require refined assessment. 
 
There are lot of uncertainties in the assessment of the collective dose and monetary costs. The 
weights of these attributes are also high. The sensitivity analysis on the weight of costs is 
shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis on costs. 
 
 
The weight on costs is about 76% of the total weight in the model and this value is marked 
with the vertical line in the figure 3. The overall score for each strategy against the percentage 
of total weight on costs are plotted with solid lines. The line with the highest intersection with 
the vertical line shows the optimal strategy, i.e., strategy 1a. 
 
As the weight on costs is between 35% and 95% strategy 1a is just optimal, but below 35% 
strategy 6b and then strategy 5, and above 95% strategy 4 will be the best courses of action, 
respectively. Besides this range gives the accuracy needed in the weighting the costs attribute, 
it also reflects the required accuracy in the costs calculation because the 'length' of an attribute 
is taken into account when assessing trade-offs, on the assumption that there is consistency in 
costs calculation between strategies. 
 
The sensitivity analysis on the weight of collective dose is shown in figure 4. With the present 
weight (15%) on dose, the strategy 1a ranks best. The highest value of the collective dose was 
obtained in the pathway where the contaminated wood is used without restrictions. It was felt 
that this might be too high. The analysis suggests that substantial changes would be required 
before the strategies 5 and 6 become more preferred. 
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Figure 4. The sensitivity analysis on collective dose. 
 
 
Because strategies 5 and 6 seem not to be the best course of action the analysis was revised 
omitting these strategies from the analysis. Doing this the effect of decontamination on 
decision is more clearly seen. The same trade-offs is used as earlier, but because the 'length' 
of scales are changed the following weights given in Table VIII are obtained: 
 
 
Table VIII. Weights of attributes in revised analysis. 
 
Attribute  Weight 
Collective dose 0.086 
Individual dose of workers 0.00003 
Number of workers 0.0014 
Monetary costs of action 0.16 
Economic benefit 0.23 
Stress 0.34 
Quality of the environment 0.17 
 
 
The ranking of strategies for analysis based upon above-mentioned weights are given in Table 
IX. 
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Table IX. Overall scores for the revised analysis. 
 
Strategy  1a 1b  2a 2b  3a  3b 4 
Overall score 0.73 0.60 0.72 0.59 0.69 0.47 0.33 
Rank 1st  4th 2nd  5th 3rd 6th 7th 
 
 
The ranking of strategies is - as it should be - the same as in the initial analysis. However, the 
difference between the strategies is more clearly seen. Now the sensitivity analysis on the 
weight of collective dose is as is shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis on collective dose. Strategies 5 and 6 are omitted from the 
analysis. 
 
 
The difference between stetegies 1a, 2a and 3a is not large and the analysis suggests that the 
best course of action could be found in this group of strategies. There should be modifications 
in strategies 1b, 2b and 3b, or changes in numbers or trade-offs before this group of action 
will become more attractive. As is shown in figure 5 strategies 2b and 4 are never optimal 
actions considering the values and the trade-offs used in the analysis. 
 
Before final conclusion on the action it is useful to gain further understanding considering 
stress attribute. It was unpleasant to assess numbers on this attribute and because the weight 
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on this attribute is also high, its effect on decision should be further considered. This could be 
done with figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 shows that increasing scores go with increasing preferences. The figure plots the 
overall utility for all other effects excluding stress against stress. In principle the strategy 
represented by a cross in the upper right corner is most preferred. On the upper right 
boundary (Pareto or efficient frontier) lie strategies 1a, 2a, 3a and 2b in this diagram. The 
optimal choice depends on value put on stress. As the value increases from 0 to 100 the 
optimality moves from strategy 3a to strategy 1a and through 2a to 2b. These strategies offer 
better choice, i.e., they dominate strategies 1b, 3b and 4 which can never be optimal without 
changes in their scores and weights. 
 
 
 1.000
 0.000
40 100
1A 2A3A
1B 2B
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OVERALL
(Utility)
STRESS (score)
Preference Set =   
 
Figure 6. Plot of utility against stress. 
 
 
8.6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this study has been to give an illustration of decision analysis and the 
application of the analysis when planning countermeasures for forest areas in order to 
mitigate the consequences of a nuclear accident. The basic principles of radiation protection 
are based on the justification and optimization of protective actions. Decision analysis, 
although closely entwined with these principles, does not interpret the results with this 
terminology. The aim of decision analysis is to find the best solution to a problem based on 
the rationality of the decision maker(s). However, the result of decision analysis can be 
translated to correspond to the basic principles of radiation protection. 
 
At the beginning of a decision analysis all feasible protective actions are defined, including 
the action of doing nothing. When assessing the justification of protective actions, the present 
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situation forms the basis to which the actions are compared, with respect to the preferences of 
society represented by a decision maker. The preferences and trade-offs - the judgmental 
inputs to analysis - form the basis for justification. A protective action is justified if the values 
connected to it are greater than those of no action. 
 
The optimization of the intervention is achieved by ranking all feasible actions. The action 
with the highest ranking will produce the maximum benefit. In optimization it is thus assumed 
that all actions and attributes are defined at the beginning of an analysis. In practice, however, 
it is not possible to define all actions before making some preliminary numerical assessments 
and running through some rough calculations to gain a feeling for what numbers are 
important and require refined assessment. The optimization of intervention means this 
iterative process of maximization of protection in all its essentials. The setting of an inter-
vention level in an accident situation or in planning of the intervention levels is seldom a 
purely mathematical problem. 
 
The decision analysis performed suggest that a strategy somewhere between 1a and 2a would 
be the best course of action to be taken in the given situation.  There would be a few 
differences between these strategies. The treatment of areas are quite the same: in area II trees 
would be removed during the same season and in area III 'doing nothing' would be taken in 
both strategies. No action in area III was deemed to be more preferred to the actions 'control 
of access' or 'control of wood material'. In the area I the trees and undervegetation are 
removed and the only difference between strategies 1 and 2 is the removal of soil in strategy 
1. Also, strategy 3a could be considered as an action. In all strategies the removed trees would 
be burned as fuel. 
 
There are different preferences connected to the values of attributes. Therefore, the values of 
attributes and trade-offs are subjective, not objective. Expressing the value may be both 
unpleasant and difficult, but often it is very crucial when assessing an intervention level. 
Since the values are subjective, no universal values exist. The values are related to the unique 
problem, and in addition, they change according to opinions and resources. In addition, 
people have strong feelings and beliefs about these values, which typically are not 
numerically quantified and do not exist in monetary form. Careful structuring of the problem 
is necessary to identify the underlying multidimensional values, attitudes to risk and trade-
offs related to the problem. To create more insight more research is needed, specially on the 
less quantifiable factors. 
 
The analysis represented above is based on hypothetical accident. In real problem depending 
on prevailing situation where the fallout area could be located in the map, more strategies 
would have to be considered. Also, the factors entering the decision are dependent on 
situation. Thus, the results of the performed analysis could not be applied in real situation as 
such, but the actions and factors should be revised and the calculations redone. The strategies 
found appropriate in the analyzed situation might turn out not to be the most preferred in the 
real problem, however, they might well indicate the course of actions to be considered. 
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